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ABSTRACT 
This paper marks a departure from the focus on external stakeholders in much research on legitimacy 
and Multinational Corporations, adopting a social psychological approach to study how MNCs build 
internal legitimacy for controversial decisions with their subsidiaries. We explore this through a 
longitudinal, real-time qualitative case study of a regional office relocation, since office relocations 
represent rare yet significant strategic decisions. We analyze the interplay between the legitimation 
strategies of senior managers and subsidiary legitimacy judgments, based in instrumental, relational, 
and moral considerations, and how the relationship between the two develops over time. From this 
analysis we derive inductively a process model that reveals the dynamics of building internal 
legitimacy with subsidiaries, and how an MNC moves on even in the absence of full legitimacy, when 
dealing with controversial MNC decisions. The model highlights two important dynamics. The first is 
a dynamic between legitimation strategies and legitimacy judgments and how this is influenced by 
local subsidiary contexts. The second is a temporal dynamic in how both the legitimation strategies 
and legitimacy judgments evolve over time. Our model contributes to research on legitimacy in 
MNCs, what we know about tensions that characterize MNC sub-unit relationships, and research on 
headquarters relocation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is well established in international business research that legitimacy is critical for a Multinational 
Corporation (MNC) to survive and endure across its different contexts, markets and stakeholders 
(Chan & Makino, 2007; Delmestri & Wezel, 2011; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Kostova, Roth, & Dacin, 
2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). This body of research has typically explored legitimacy ³D
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate 
ZLWKLQVRPHVRFLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHGV\VWHPRIQRUPVYDOXHVEHOLHIVDQGGHILQLWLRQV´6XFKPDQ, 1995: 
574), from the perspective of external stakeholders. This focus on external legitimacy highlights the 
complexity of maintaining legitimacy for MNCs given the multiple institutional environments in 
which they operate (Chan & Makino, 2007; Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). By 
comparison, this paper focuses on internal legitimacy, ³WKHDFFHSWDQFHDQGDSSURYDORI an 
organizational unit by the other units within WKHILUP´ (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999: 72), which has 
received less attention despite its theoretical and empirical significance.  
When internal legitimacy has been considered, the concern has primarily been on how 
subsidiaries build legitimacy for their decisions and actions with their parent (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999; see also Bouquet and Birkinshaw, 2008a). Thus, these studies have overlooked an important 
aspect of internal legitimacy, namely that decisions by the MNC parent may also need to be 
legitimated within subsidiaries (Kostova & Roth, 2002), and particularly those subsidiaries that need 
to take action for these decisions to be implemented.   
Considering such processes of legitimation is important because we know that legitimacy is 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKDWWLWXGHVDQGEHKDYLRUVWKDWODUJHO\GHWHUPLQHSHRSOH¶VUHVSRQVHVWRGHFLVLRQVRU
changes (Huy, Corley, & Kraatz, 2014; Tost, 2011; Vaara & Monin, 2010). The lack of attention to 
legitimation processes in Headquarters (HQ)-subsidiary relationships is a serious omission given that 
we know this relationship forms a fundamental part of decision-making in the MNC organization 
(Blazejewski & Becker-Ritterspach, 2011; Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006; Geppert & Williams, 
2006; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993), and is also often characterized by conflict and resistance due to 
geographic distance and cross-border tensions (Balogun, Jarzabkowski, & Vaara, 2011; Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008b; Clark & Geppert, 2011; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Schotter & Beamish, 2011). 
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Hence understanding subsidiary evaluation of the legitimacy of MNC parent decisions and the 
associated social dynamics provides an opportunity to develop a more holistic picture of the tensions 
and conflict in HQ-subsidiary relationships and their implications. This is especially the case for 
controversial decisions that have the potential to generate conflict between the parent and subsidiary. 
To explore internal legitimation we need to reconsider the theoretical basis of what analysis 
of legitimacy and legitimation is typically based on in the international business context. In particular, 
this requires moving theoretically from an institutional theory oriented approach focusing on 
legitimation strategies towards a perspective that enables a focus on legitimacy evaluations or 
judgments. For that purpose, we draw from advances made by social psychologically oriented 
organization scholars (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011) to elaborate on the 
dynamics of legitimacy judgment formation and evolution over time. The socio-psychological 
SHUVSHFWLYHHQDEOHVH[SORUDWLRQRIOHJLWLPDF\IURPWKHDXGLHQFH¶VSHUVSHFWLYH.  Accordingly, we 
define legitimacy judgments as the evaluations of organizational members that assess specific actions 
or decisions as desirable or appropriate within a specific context (Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011). Also, 
consistent with these recent social psychological approaches we recognize the need to focus on 
legitimation as a process (Bitektine, 2011), that requires dual consideration of the legitimacy 
judgments of RUJDQL]DWLRQPHPEHUV¶Dnd the managerial legitimation strategies, that is the efforts to 
shape, reinforce, or suppress legitimacy judgments (Bitektine and Haack, 2015). 
Thus, we pursue a dynamic perspective conceptualizing MNC internal legitimation processes 
in terms of an interplay over time between the legitimation strategies of MNC top managers and 
subsidiary legitimacy judgments (see also Huy et al., 2014; Vaara & Monin, 2010). This leads us to 
formulate our research questions as follows: How do subsidiary legitimacy judgments form and 
develop over time in response to HQ managerV¶OHJLWLPDWLRQVWUDWHJLHVin the case of controversial 
decisions?  How does the MNC move on in the face of conflict over legitimacy?  
To be able to study these legitimation processes in context we focus on the phenomenon of 
MNC headquarter (HQ) location decisions, since office relocations represent significant yet relatively 
rare strategic events (Coeurderoy & Verbeke, 2016). The dynamics of MNC HQ relocations has 
received little attention until relatively recently (Laamanen, Simula, & Torstila, 2012). The research 
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there is elucidates the motives for, and likelihood of, relocation decisions in terms of factors such as 
investment, employment and tax returns (Birkinshaw, Braunerhjelm, Holm, & Terjesen, 2006; 
Laamanen et al., 2012). It also shows that these location decisions can be controversial externally and 
internally, and thereby result in legitimacy struggles, since they typically involve one country and one 
subsidiary gaining at the expense of others.  
We examine these dynamics by drawing on a qualitative, longitudinal, real-time case study of 
the reorganization of the European region of an MNC. The reorganization involved the bringing 
together of two divisions which also necessitated a reconsideration of the regional head office location 
and subsequently its relocation. The location chosen needed to facilitate the new strategy which 
included centralization of functions, such as marketing, to build on growing synergies across Europe, 
but also increased efficiency. Thus, the new regional office was likely to be controversial internally as 
it would lead to a change in mandate for subsidiaries who would have less autonomy in decision-
making under a more centralized business model, and have implications for the career paths and 
locations of subsidiary employees. Our research design enabled tracking for close to three years of 
how the relocation decision, and its implications for individuals and the organization, was 
communicated internally, and provided data on how one subsidiary, the UK, experienced the decision 
and the changes that unfolded. 
Our findings reveal a clear temporal pattern in the way both HQ legitimation strategies and 
subsidiary legitimacy judgments develop in the context of contentious decisions. We show how the 
particular combination of legitimation strategies used by HQ managers led to negative subsidiary 
legitimacy judgments based in instrumental, relational, and moral considerations, also influenced by 
the local subsidiary context. To enable the MNC to move on, HQ managers needed to reinforce 
legitimation through additional strategies that indicated an inevitability of the decision to the 
subsidiary. This led subsidiary members to engage in coping and compliance, manifested in black 
humor and cynicism as forms of dissonance reduction, in response to the perceived inevitability of the 
decision. Thus, our analysis shows how MNCs can move on with controversial decisions such as HQ 
relocations even in the context of a lack of full internal legitimacy. 
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Our analysis makes three contributions. First, by unpacking the dynamics of processes of 
internal legitimation it adds to research on legitimacy and legitimation in MNCs (Delmestri & Wezel, 
2011; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Through our 
introduction of a social psychological approach we are able to place a focus on subsidiary judgments 
to develop a model that elucidates how these judgments form and evolve over time and how they are 
influenced by +4PDQDJHUV¶legitimation strategies. Second, our findings add to what we know about 
the tensions that characterize MNC sub-unit relationships and the role of power and politics in them 
(Balogun et al., 2011; Clark & Geppert, 2011; Schotter & Beamish, 2011). Finally, our empirical 
analysis also adds to nascent research on HQ relocation (Laamanen et al., 2012) by highlighting the 
internal legitimation challenges that are likely to often characterize these decisions. 
A DYNAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON SUBSIDIARY LEVEL LEGITIMACY 
Legitimacy in MNCs 
Legitimacy is a key issue in international business research, and this has resulted in an increasing 
volume of theoretical and empirical work on legitimacy, especially in the MNC context (Chan & 
Makino, 2007; Delmestri & Wezel, 2011; Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). This stream 
of research has established that because MNCs operate in multiple institutional and cultural contexts, 
legitimacy is not a straightforward issue but one that involves multiple arenas and ongoing concerns 
(Delmestri & Wezel, 2011; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Kostova et al., 2008). A key part of this work has 
been the distinction of external and internal legitimacy, the former referring to how the MNCs 
operations, decisions, or actions are perceived by external stakeholders, and the latter to how these are 
viewed from inside the corporation (Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
As we have established in the introduction, international business research has so far 
primarily focused on the challenges for MNC parents of seeking and maintaining external legitimacy 
within multiple host country environments, neglecting the equal importance for MNC parents of 
building and maintaining legitimacy for their decisions internally with their subsidiaries (Chan & 
Makino, 2007; Delmestri & Wezel, 2011; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Kostova et al., 2008). How MNC 
parents build internal legitimacy is not a straightforward consideration, however. It is not just that the 
HQ-subsidiary relationship is often characterized by conflict and resistance due to geographic 
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distance and cross-border tensions (Balogun et al., 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008b; Clark & Geppert, 2011; Geppert, Becker-Ritterspach, & Mudambi, 2016; 
Jarzabkowski & Balogun, 2009; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004; Schmid & Daniel, 2011; Schotter & 
Beamish, 2011). In addition, there is not always a simple dyadic relationship between MNC parents 
and subsidiaries, since MNCs are often composed of nested hierarchical relationships between 
corporate headquarters, regional headquarters and subsidiaries (Hoenen & Kostova, 2015) rather than 
linear chains of decision-making. As a result, a regional unit, for example, has to face three ways to 
build legitimacy for any decisions ± externally, internally and upwards with the parent, and internally 
and downwards with relevant subsidiaries. 
 The neglect of considerations of internal legitimacy in international business research is 
significant since legitimacy theory brings benefits to the study of internal reactions to change, partly 
because it places a focus on change-agent recipient interactions in a way that integrates the macro-
institutional with the micro-sociological, but also because it avoids the common tendency to view 
managers as in the right and employees as irrational and unnecessarily obstructive if they show any 
signs of disagreement or resistance (Huy et al., 2014). Hence a consideration of internal legitimacy 
strikes at the heart of discussions in the international business literature regarding the nature of the 
tensions that characterize HQ±subsidiary relationships and decision-making. Nevertheless, a shift to 
the VWXG\RILQWHUQDOOHJLWLPDF\UHTXLUHVDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHDXGLHQFH¶VSHUVSHFWLYHLQSURFHVVHV
of legitimation. Importantly, it requires a focus on legitimacy judgments of the rarely studied internal 
audience.   
A Social Psychological Perspective on Legitimacy Judgments 
There are several perspectives on legitimacy, including more institutional and social psychological 
approaches (Deephouse, Bundy, Tost, & Suchman, 2017; Suchman, 1995; Suddaby, Bitektine, & 
Haack, 2017). In prior research, most attention has been paid to the strategies of those trying to build 
legitimacy, which has typically implied an institutional perspective. Research has explored how issues 
are framed (Creed, Scully, & Austin, 2002; Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 2004) and how impression 
management is used in legitimation (Arndt & Bigelow, 2000; Elsbach, 1994; Elsbach & Sutton, 
1992). For example, Creed et al., (2002) show how agents build legitimating accounts by mobilizing 
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and combining elements from multiple broader cultural accounts. Others have singled out specific 
elements in rhetorical justifications (Green, 2004; Suddaby & Greenwood 2005), discursive strategies 
(Vaara & Monin, 2010; Vaara, Tienari, & Laurila, 2006), legitimating narratives (Golant & Sillince, 
2007) or framings (Lefsrud & Meyer, 2012).  
Some studies propose that legitimation strategies may extend beyond the rhetorical and 
discursive to involve other actions, such as coercive tactics to do with enforcing decisions and 
changes based on formal authority or other power bases (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Suchman, 1995), 
including non-verbal as well as verbal cues (Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001 
Suchman, 1995; Tost, 2011). More importantly, however, this focus on legitimation strategies has led 
to a neglect of in-depth consideration RIVWDNHKROGHUV¶OHJLWLPDF\judgments until relatively recently 
(Bitektine, 2011; Tost, 2011), despite early recognition of the role of the audience in the construction 
of legitimacy and legitimacy as a socially constructed phenomenon (Suchman, 1995).  
We therefore adopt a social psychological perspective on legitimacy (Huy et al., 2014; Tost, 
2011; Zelditch, 2006) that encourages a focus on legitimation processes, i.e. attention to legitimation 
strategies and legitimacy judgment formation over time (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; 
Tost, 2011). Important in this is the recognition of the influence of legitimation strategies on the 
formation and suppression of legitimacy judgments (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). This perspective thus 
enables a dual consideration of legitimation strategies of MNC managers and legitimacy judgments of 
subsidiary members. Attention is given to how evaluators arrive at legitimacy judgments (Bitektine & 
Haack, 2015), and the content of such judgments (Tost, 2011), emphasizing the subjective assessment 
RIOHJLWLPDF\DQGWKHQHJOHFWHGUROHRIWKH³DXGLHQFH´in legitimation dynamics (Bitektine, 2011). The 
H[SORUDWLRQRIWKHHYDOXDWRU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHSURYLGHVIRULQVLJKWLQWRWKHVRFLDODQGFRJQLWLYHIDFWRUVWKDW
are part of judgment formation and that can compromise the efforts of those seeking legitimacy for 
their organizations (Bitektine, 2011). In addition, those advocating a social psychological perspective 
extend consideration of legitimation strategies beyond the discursive, to include other actions and 
tactics. 
Social psychologists and institutional theorists differ in the way they consider legitimacy 
judgments (Tost, 2011). Institutional theorists typically differentiate between pragmatic, moral, and 
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FRJQLWLYH3UDJPDWLFOHJLWLPDF\UHODWHVWRVWDNHKROGHUV¶VXSSRUWIRUDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶VDFWLYLW\EDVHG
on calculations of their own self-interest. Moral legitimacy relates to approval of an organization and 
its activities by its various stakeholders, in terms of whether the particular activity is considered to be 
³WKH ULJKWWKLQJWRGR´6XFKPDQ, 1995: 579). Cognitive legitimacy, on the other hand, deals with 
taken-for-grantedness (Bitektine, 2011; Suchman, 1995), in other words the absence of questioning 
regarding the validity of an entity or challenges to it.  
From a social psychology perspective, Tost stresses the need to look at the content of 
legitimacy judgments to understand ³WKHVXEVWDQWLYHSHUFHSWLRQVDQGEHOLHIVWKDWXQGHUOLHWKH
MXGJPHQWRIDQHQWLW\DVOHJLWLPDWHRULOOHJLWLPDWH´(2011: 687).  She therefore maintains that since 
cognitive legitimacy represents the absence of content it is not part of the substantive content of 
legitimacy judgments. It is only when there is an absence of cognitive validity that stakeholders are 
likely to engage in more effortful evaluative judgments (Bitektine, 2011; Drori & Honig, 2013). Tost 
argues instead that the content of legitimacy judgments comprises three dimensions: drawing on 
consideration of instrumental, relational, and moral legitimacy from social psychology, equating 
instrumental legitimacy judgments with pragmatic through the self-interested orientation involved in 
both; and citing overlap between the moral categories since this category in both literatures is related 
WRDQ³DXGLHQFH¶VVRFLDOO\FRQVWUXFWHGYDOXHV\VWHP´ (2011: 692 and Suchman 1995: 579). An entity 
is viewed as legitimate on instrumental grounds when it is ³SHUFHLYHGWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VRU
JURXS¶VDWWHPSWVWRUHDFKVHOI-GHILQHGRULQWHUQDOL]HGJRDOVRURXWFRPHV´VXFKDV³SHUFHSWLRQs or 
beliefs UHODWHGWRWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVHIILFLHQF\RUXWLOLW\RIWKHHQWLW\´ (Tost 2011: 693). Relational 
legitimacy exists for an entity when it ³FRPPXQLFDWHVWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOWKDWVKHRUKHLVDFFRUGHG
respect, dignity, and status within the group context´Tost 2011: 690) and is ³SHUFHLYHGWRDIILUPWKH
social identity and self-worth of individuals or social groups and to ensure that individuals or social 
groups are treated with dignity and respect and receive outcomes commensurate with their 
entitOHPHQWV´(p 693-4). This judgment is to do with process, how the decision is being carried out, 
since it is concerned with perceptions of the treatment of individuals in terms of fairness or 
benevolence. 0RUDOOHJLWLPDF\H[LVWVIRUDQHQWLW\³ZKHQLWLVperceived to be consistent with the 
evaluatoU¶VPRUDODQGHWKLFDOYDOXHV´ (Tost 2011: 694). 
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HQ Relocation as a Revealing Context 
To examine these processes in context we focus on the issue of HQ relocation. MNC office 
relocations represent rare yet significant strategic decisions (Coeurderoy & Verbeke, 2016) and, as 
such, are  likely to be controversial. Studies show how such decisions alter the balance in terms of 
winners and losers between host country governments (see Laamanen et al., 2012) because as a head 
office relocates, some host governments may be losers and others winners in terms of, for example, 
investment, employment, and tax opportunities. Furthermore, the acceptability of new organizational 
forms may vary across locales due to differences in local cultural scripts (Delmestri & Wezel, 2011). 
Internally, HQ relocations have to be legitimated to subsidiary employees, who may also be 
winners and losers, since some employees may need to relocate to keep their jobs and others may 
have to accept new processes and systems, and lesser promotion opportunities as subsidiaries change 
to accommodate the new head office and their relationship with it. Some studies have examined the 
strategies used by subsidiaries in responding to dual internal and external pressures for legitimacy 
(Hillman & Wan, 2005). However, we argue that it is particularly important to understand dynamics 
of legitimation for strategic decisions in MNCs, such as HQ relocations, that require senior managers 
to build legitimacy not only externally with host governments but also internally with subsidiary 
based employees. Given the cross-border issues involved, some controversial decisions may never 
gain full legitimacy in all parts of the MNC, which raises questions as to how these dynamics play out 
over time.  
If a relocation is accompanied, as here, by a new strategy and a shift in the HQ-subsidiary 
dependence-independence balance, this may also result in a reduction in mandate for subsidiaries, 
which can exacerbate the sense of winners and losers. Furthermore, when studying 
parent/regional/subsidiary change processes to understand those subtle and nuanced dynamics through 
which both HQ and subsidiaries subjectively reconstruct their relationships with each other, and of 
which legitimacy is a part (Huy et al., 2014), it is particularly interesting to study subsidiaries where 
voice and political power is high (Balogun et al., 2011; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008a; Geppert & 
Williams, 2006). Balogun et al. (2011) argue that this means focusing on subsidiaries with a strategic 
position and economic performance that render them important, alongside an institutional 
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embeddedness in their local country that accords them greater independence of practices and authority 
than others may have. Such subsidiaries ³represent critical cases of MNC voice, political tensions 
between independence and interdependence, and their effects as they unfold during times of strategic 
integration.´ (Balogun et al., 2011: 768). In this paper we therefore explore how subsidiary legitimacy 
judgments form and develop from the perspective of such a subsidiary in the context of controversial 
HQ relocation decisions. 
METHODS 
The research is based on a qualitative, longitudinal case study that follows the implementation of 
strategic transformation in the European Division of Brand Co, a multinational corporation (MNC). 
The initial purpose of the research was not to explore issues connected with the decision to relocate 
the European regional HQ, but to focus on the change process in the MNC in general and in the UK 
subsidiary in particular. The issues surrounding HQ relocation and its legitimation as part of the 
change process only surfaced as change progressed and the relocation decision played out.  
The UK subsidiary had historically been used to significant autonomy in Brand Co and had 
been one of the highest performing subsidiaries within Europe, with its largely unique, UK centric, 
stable of brands. Thus the creation of a new European head office, and accompanying changes, 
represented a significant shift in mandate for the UK, and more so than for other subsidiaries with a 
less country centric stable of brands and less historical success. 
What was interesting in the data was the way members of the UK subsidiary constantly 
FKDOOHQJHGWKH(XURSHDQPDQDJHUV¶OHJLWLPDtion claims for the choice of location and its implications 
for the way the regional organization was structured, despite the fact that the relocation and 
restructuring was one many other organizations had undertaken and did not require extensive external 
legitimacy work. Another interesting factor was that apparently legitimacy for the decision was never 
fully established in the UK, yet the European organization was able to move on. As such, the research 
follows an inductive approach, in which we followed interesting lines of enquiry that emerged from 
the case study. 
A single exploratory case study is ideal for our purposes because such studies provide access 
to phenomena such as ours that are difficult to access or observe (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 
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1994) and because it provided the means for examining the temporal dynamics of building internal 
legitimacy with subsidiaries in MNCs. In particular it provided access to 1) how senior European 
managers sought to legitimate the choice of HQ location and the relocation implications to their 
European subsidiaries, 2) how staff in one subsidiary, the UK, facing a significant change in mandate, 
responded in terms of legitimacy judgments, and 3) how the MNC moved on from this to generate the 
needed acceptance, if not full legitimacy, for the decision. Our qualitative data provide access to the 
ZRUOGYLHZVRISHRSOHXQGHUVWXG\DQGWKHLQVLGHUV¶Soint of view, consistent with the actor-centered 
approaches called for both in research on MNCs (Piekkari, Welch, & Paavilainen, 2009) and 
legitimacy (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). In particular, a focus on legitimacy judgment formation 
requires attention to both the communicative and the nonverbal actions of the evaluators as 
manifestations of their cognition (Tost, 2011). 
The European region was restructured at the end of 2005 to create a more integrated mode of 
operation across its European subsidiaries in response to changing and increasingly competitive 
European market dynamics. The restructuring was positioned as part of the solution. It centralized 
marketing and other functions in order to create faster decision-making and innovation while taking 
advantage of growing synergies across Europe and also generating economies of scale. In particular, it 
created a single European regional division from two previous divisions, for which there was to be a 
new Regional HQ in a location that supported the new strategy by facilitating the desired integration 
and the drive for efficiencies. A new European board was formed, to which country VPs and their 
country boards reported. The centralized marketing function was to hold the P&L and decision-
making power (strategy, marketing) for brands across Europe. The leadership of all the newly 
centralized functions and departments were to be based in the new European HQ with the European 
Executive Team. Only the sales function was to be left local to focus on retailers.  
At the end of 2005, all that had been said about the new HQ was that it would be based in a 
tax-efficient location. Those who accepted positions in the new structure (e.g. senior marketing 
people) that were likely to require relocation to the new head office were required to confirm they 
were aware of this and were willing to relocate. Meanwhile, they continued to work in their existing 
locations. It was said that for Brand Co to be able to take full advantage of any new location 
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including, for example, tax advantages, all decision-making would need to take place there, ³and so, 
WKHVHQLRUWHDPKDYHWREHUHVLGHQWWKHUH<RXFDQ¶WFRPPXWH\RXFDQ¶WKDYHDQDSDUWPHQWWKHUHDQG
come home at weekends ... You have to live thereDQGLI\RX¶YHJRWDIDPLO\\RXU family have to be 
WKHUHDQG\RXUFKLOGUHQKDYHWREHLQWKHHGXFDWLRQV\VWHPHWFHWFHWF´ (UK Manager, Dec 2005). 
At the end of August 2006 the chosen HQ location, Eurocity, was announced. Now those due 
to relocate had to decide whether they were really willing to do so. In addition, the location decision 
started a new wave of change-related activity at the European level and among those who potentially 
had to relocate. The senior European managers needed to communicate the decision in a way that 
convinced those affected, e.g. those who had to relocate to the chosen city, but also others who would 
feel the consequences of the relocation as colleagues and decision making moved. This set off a chain 
of events summarized in the timeline in Figure 1. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
Data Collection 
The data were collected by the first author as part of the larger research project following the overall 
implementation of change in the European Division of Brand Co, and the co-evolution of the 
European strategy and structure and the UK subsidiary. Fieldwork was conducted over a period of 
nearly three years, from end of 2005 to August 2008. The data collection was designed to facilitate the 
study of both what was happening at the European level as change developed and in the UK. The first 
author therefore spent considerable time at the UK offices, providing access to UK managers and 
employees, but also individuals now in European managerial roles who remained in the UK until 
relocation to the new head office later in 2007. Data were collected from interviews, focus groups, 
and observations of key organizational events, and included a range of documentary evidence, 
together providing the dual European / UK access required.  
First, documentary evidence was collected in the form of internal European and UK 
newsletters and email announcements, intranet announcements, conference speeches, and 
presentations by the European President and other senior European managers. The purpose of this 
data collection was to capture background data on the change process and also what was being 
communicated across Europe and specifically in the UK. Importantly, it also enabled the tracking and 
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analysis over time of legitimation strategies adopted in seeking to build internal legitimacy for the 
relocation and associated changes. 
Second, the first author undertook observation of key organizational events (as well as 
observations of day-to-day activities when on site). These included, for example, UK management 
team change workshops (March 2006 & December 2006) and annual UK employee conferences to 
enable tracking of the change process in the UK. Also important was observation of European 
leadership team annual roadshows to the UK (end of 2005, early 2007), to enable tracking of how 
change was communicated by senior European managers, thus providing additional access to their 
legitimation claims. Consistent with best practice, extensive field notes were taken at all of these 
events and typed up within 24 hours, including details of who said and did what, and with copies of 
relevant PowerPoint presentations.  
Third, essential to capturing European and UK perspectives on change, its progress and its 
impact, were interviews. Interviewees were selected to facilitate this, leading to a pool of 
approximately 35 individuals who were interviewed regularly throughout 2006, 2007 and 2008.  This 
included the UK Senior Managers, their direct functional reports, senior European Marketers, and 
senior UK based marketers. Interview protocols focused on current change actions being undertaken 
by the interviewees and others, and their views and perspective on the progress of change, with earlier 
interviews also focusing on the background to change. The pool was largely stable; anyone that left or 
moved role was typically replaced by their appointed successors. In all, there were 226 interviews. 
These were of an average length of 45 minutes to 1.5 hours. Interviews were recorded and transcribed, 
with notes taken and typed up within 24 hours on the odd occasions when an interviewee requested 
not to be recorded, or the interview took the form more of an informal conversation. Since the purpose 
of the research was not initially a focus on the relocation, individuals were not selected as 
interviewees with this in mind. However, due to the nature of the change process, many of the 
European managerial interviewees were in roles requiring relocation. Thus, interviews provided 
access to first-hand views on those involved in the changes. And, of course, everyone knew 
organization members earmarked for relocation and were impacted by the relocation and associated 
changes as they got underway.  
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  Fourth, data were collected through focus groups in the UK (46 in total) to extend data 
collection beyond UK senior managers and their reports. These were run across functions (sales, 
marketing, logistics, finance, HR) and were designed to facilitate access to views in the UK about the 
change process, and track its progress in the UK subsidiary. Individuals were selected to be 
representative of function and hierarchy. 50 ± 60 organization members regularly attended these 
groups (an average of 10 per group), but the numbers could vary as individuals moved roles or left the 
organization. Discussion focused on views of the change process, including of course the relocation. 
All focus groups were recorded and transcribed with the permission of the attendees. The groups were 
facilitated to WDNH DGYDQWDJH RI WKH ³VQRZEDOO HIIHFW´ %DORJXQ +XII 	 -RKQVRQ, 2003) whereby 
participants build on contributions from each other.  
Thus, the data provided real-time access to the ways in which European HQ managers sought 
to build legitimacy internally for the head office relocation along with the responses in the UK 
subsidiary to these legitimation strategies.  Interviews with UK managers, and focus groups with UK 
non-managerial staff, captured the responses of subsidiary members to the legitimation strategies of 
the European HQ PDQDJHUV,IZHXQGHUVWDQGOHJLWLPDF\LQWHUPVRIFRQVWLWXHQWV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRI
RUJDQL]DWLRQDODFWLRQVDQGLQWHUPVRI³Drelationship with an audience, rather than being a 
possession RIWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ´6XFKPDQ, 1995: 594), these interviews and focus groups were key in 
gaining insight to the legitimacy judgments of subsidiary actors. They allowed us to track the 
dynamics of HQ legitimation strategies and UK UHFLSLHQWV¶OHJLWLPDF\MXGJPHQWVDQGKRZWKHVH
developed over time. Media texts were also gathered that showed how such relocations were 
communicated by the Eurocity authorities and the legitimation claims in them.  
Data analysis 
In the first stage of analysis we constructed rich descriptions in the form of timelines and accounts 
(Langley, 1999; Balogun et al., 2011) of key events in the introduction and implementation of the 
relocation decision. In this descriptive account we captured details of the key legitimation strategies 
through which European HQ managers attempted to convince internal constituents of the rationale for 
the changes and the benefits that would be realized from the new head office location. We also 
captured key themes in responses of UK employees to these legitimation attempts to determine the 
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nature of the judgments they were developing and why. This enabled us to identify interactions 
between strategies and judgments, but also importantly to analyze each separately in detail to better 
XQGHUVWDQGWKHLQWHUDFWLRQDQGKRZWKHVXEVLGLDU\PHPEHUV¶legitimacy judgments were developing. 
In our second stage of analysis we interrogated the data inductively in order to identify the 
emergence and persistence over time of different themes in the legitimation strategies of European 
managers and in the UK responses. We used NVivo qualitative software package to search and code 
the data and to organize and examine further the central themes emerging in the analysis. Consistent 
with the principles of inductive data analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994), our coding of data and the 
development and revision of categories was undertaken in an iterative process with the authors 
reaching agreement on the prevalence and interpretation of central themes and, over time, aggregate 
dimensions that link to existing theoretical constructs. Our early coding was very detailed and based 
on the terminology of the research participants to create in vivo codes (Van Maanen, 1979). We then 
clustered these into thematically related categories (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013).  See Figure 2. 
Insert figure 2 about here 
Our coding and analysis of the thematic categories for the (XURSHDQPDQDJHUV¶LQWHUQDO
legitimation strategies led us first to identify certain types of claims. We identified claims which could 
be categorized according to appeals on the basis of personal or organizational benefits and in terms of 
WKHVWUDWHJLFEXVLQHVVFDVHXQGHUSLQQLQJWKHFKDQJHV)RUH[DPSOHZHFDWHJRUL]HGPDQDJHUV¶FODLPV
DERXW³RYHUDOOTXDOLW\RIOLIH´DQGFODLPVWKDWWKHQHZORFDWLRQRIIHUHG³4XDOLW\RIWUDQVSRUWDWLRQ
LQIUDVWUXFWXUH´DVDSSHDOVEDVHGRQSHUVRQDODQGRUJDQL]DWLRQDOEHQHILWVOur coding and analysis of 
WKHVHWKHPDWLFFDWHJRULHVDOVRVKRZHGWKDWUKHWRULFDOO\(XURSHDQPDQDJHUV¶legitimation strategies 
included similar claims to those used by local Eurocity officials and other relocating companies (e.g. 
in the media) over time as they responded to broader criticism about such corporate moves. We 
categorized claims to do with the business benefits that would flow from colocation in a central 
location, such as efficiency, growth, collaboration and faster decision-making, as appeals based on the 
strategic benefits for the move.  
In addition to legitimation claims, we identified the use of other legitimation strategies which 
were evident in the actions of European managers. To consider how to categorize these we first turned 
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to Bitektine and Haack (2015) who divide strategies into 1) rhetorical to do with the content of the 
messages; 2) credibility to do with the extent to which message speakers are influential due to 
SRVLWLRQRUVWDWXVYDOLGLW\³VWDJLQJ´WRPDQLSXODWHSHUFHSWLRQVRIWDUJHWHGHYDOXDWRUVDQG
coercion / inducement. We identified that some actions were consistent with Bitektine and Haack¶V 
(2015) strategies of inducement and coercion, for example, seductive relocation visits, and classified 
them as such. However, we then identified a third category of strategies to do with building credibility 
for the decision, which appeared to be a cross-over between Bitektine and +DDFN¶VVWUDWHJLHV
of credibility and validity, including endorsement by results and pushing ahead with conviction.  
Next, our coding and analysis of responses from the UK subsidiary identified central themes 
in their evaluations that were contesting the legitimation claims of the European HQ managers. In 
their evaluations the UK made (negative) judgments about the claimed personal and organizational 
benefits, and the strategic business case. As we analyzed and thematically clustered these judgments 
in the early stages of the legitimacy building process, we found categories similar to those proposed 
by Tost (2011), and used by Huy et al. (2014), and we regularly returned to their examples and 
definitions to help our categorizations.  
We identified judgments about the significant practical consequences for those asked to 
relocate to EurocityVXFKDVLVVXHVWRGRZLWKFKLOGUHQ¶VVFKRROLQJDQGODQJXDJHDQGVSRXVH¶VFDUHHUV
but also personal careers. We also found judgments about organizational benefits, such as a 
significant potential for loss of organizational knowledge. In addition, connected to the mandate loss 
for the UK, and the new way of doing business with centralization in Eurocity, we found judgments 
about the new business model and its inability to meet the perceived need for local decision making 
for local brands (and therefore market share and profit) that prior decentralization and autonomy had 
enabled.  We categorized all of these judgments as evaluations of instrumental legitimacy, since they 
were to do with an individuDO¶VRUJURXS¶V attempts to reach internalized goals or outcomes (Huy et 
al., 2014). These judgments reflected evaluations typical of the instrumental to do with personal 
impact and self-interest as well as more organizational-OHYHOFRQFHUQVWRGRZLWKWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ¶V
effectiveness and efficiency (see Tost, 2011). 
We identified judgments to do with poor treatment of individuals and categorized these as 
18 
evaluations of relational legitimacy (Huy et al., 2014; Tost, 2011) since actions were judged as not 
SURPRWLQJRUSURWHFWLQJLQGLYLGXDOV¶GLJQLW\HQWLWOHPHQWVor self-worth. Although in some cases, there 
appeared to be overlap in evaluations of instrumental legitimacy and relational legitimacy, the 
differentiating factor was to do with the implementation process and not just the outcome.  For 
example, while we classified issues to do with negative family or career outcomes as an instrumental 
evaluation, the evaluation that people were being asked to accept the decision without receiving any 
compensation, such as a salary uplift, was classified as relational, as this was judged as not treating 
individuals with dignity or giving them outcomes commensurate with their entitlement.   
Finally, we categorized judgments we identified about the organization, such as putting 
profits before employee welfare, as judgments of moral legitimacy (Huy et al., 2014; Tost, 2011), 
since these were considered as inFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHHYDOXDWRU¶VPRUDOYDOXHV Again, there were 
apparent overlaps here. For example, evaluations that the move to Eurocity was a cost saving exercise 
and potentially damaging to a business, because it would result in a loss of knowledgeable personnel 
and take decision-making away from the market were classified as instrumental, whereas evaluations 
that moved beyond this to suggest that putting profits before people was wrong were classified as 
moral, since this was an evaluation to do with a clash between company actions and what individuals 
believed should be valued. Tost (2011) points out that such overlaps should be expected giving the 
example that if a practice is deemed efficient it is an instrumental evaluation, but in a culture that 
values efficiency, it may also influence evaluations of moral legitimacy.    
As change progressed, however, we identified additional evaluations to do with a sense of 
inevitability of the decision, and also a sense of cynicism expressed through black humor and 
mockery of the business case presented. See Figure 2. Our analysis showed these evaluations to be 
influenced by European managerV¶ actions as well as their particular legitimation claims.  
From our data analysis we built tables of supporting evidence for our identified categories of 
legitimation strategies and legitimacy judgments. We provide some of these as supporting quotations 
for our coding in the text, with additional quotations left in tables. See Tables 1 ± 4 in Findings. Our 
analysis of legitimation strategies and judgments also revealed the temporal unfolding of legitimacy 
dynamics over the period of the research as described in the following sections.  
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FINDINGS 
As a result of our analysis, we identified three key phases through which European HQ managerV¶
legitimation strategies and UK subsidiary legitimacy judgments evolved over time: initiating 
legitimation as part of the decision announcement resulting in early legitimacy judgments (end of 
2005 to announcement of office location in August 2006), building legitimation as the decision is 
implemented resulting in the development of judgments and conflict over legitimacy (August 2006 to 
mid-2007), and reinforcing legitimation to enable moving on through rationalized judgments that lead 
to acceptance, if not full legitimacy, in the subsidiary (mid-2007 to August 2008). See Figure 1.  
Phase 1: Initiating legitimation and early legitimacy judgments 
This phase focuses on the initial announcement of, and legitimation claims for, the need for a 
new head office as part of the launch of the new strategy and structure by the European managers.  It 
leads to early negative UK subsidiary legitimacy judgments as individuals question the 
appropriateness of the proposal, and reveals how early claims and judgments of these have longer-
term consequences. In particular, the negative judgments formed in this decision announcement phase 
are important to the way judgments subsequently develop. 
HQ Legitimation strategies: Initiating Legitimation 
Early on, before the particular location had been announced, the new HQ did not feature 
heavily in communications. Communications were focused primary on the rationale for the new 
strategy and structure. At the European leadership team annual roadshow to senior UK managers in 
December 2005, which focused on the new strategy and structure, the presentation positioned Brand 
Co against competitors as having a structure that hampered efficiency and effectiveness across 
Europe, with its country-specific focus leading to complex, slow decision-making. The presentation 
did, however, suggest WKHLPSRUWDQFHRID³tax efficient location´IRUWKHQHZ(XURSHDQ+4DVDNH\
component of the new European strategy.  
Legitimation claims: strategic benefits of co-location. European HQ managers sought to 
initiate legitimacy for the decision through claims connected to the strategic business case for 
efficiency and effectiveness. Relocation and colocation in one place would produce interconnected 
VWUDWHJLFEHQHILWVRIHIILFLHQF\JURZWKDQGIDVWHUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ³to accelerate decision-making, 
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clarify responsibilities and generate the greatest opportunities for growth in the EU Region´Email 
Announcement, Nov 2005) and ³&XUUHQWVWUXFWXUHKDPSHUVHIIHFWLYHQHVVDQGHIILFLHQF\«FRPSOH[
internal decision making «for example 12 people from 10 different countries wanting a say in for 
H[DPSOHWKHDGYHUWLVLQJ´ (European leadership team annual roadshow to senior UK managers, Dec 
DQG³our new EU organization will also drive growth by reducing costs´Email 
Announcement, Feb 2006).   
UK Response: Forming Early Legitimacy Judgments 
In 2006 early judgments about the legitimation claims, prior to the announcement of the new 
HQ location, largely centered on speculation about whether claimed business benefits would be 
achieved given possible negative consequences. 
Evaluations of instrumental legitimacy: business implications. From the beginning, in 2006, 
there were concerns in the UK that the claimed business benefits of effectiveness and efficiency 
would have negative implications, such as a loss of talent since the organization did not KDYHD³fully 
mobile workforce´8.,QWHUYLHZ0DU with estimates of a 30% loss.  ³I think there are a lot 
RISHRSOHLQWKDWVLWXDWLRQWKDWKDYHKDGWRDFFHSWMREV«NQRZLQJLWVVRPHZKHUHLQ(XURSH6R,
think there could potentially be a lot of faOORXW«SHRSOHDUHZDLWLQJWRVHHZKHUHWKHQHZ
KHDGTXDUWHUVLV´(UK Interview, March 2006). Subsidiary employees raised concerns about the roles 
required to move and the implications of the relocation for the business: ³In order to satisfy that tax 
efficLHQWPRGHOFHUWDLQNH\UROHVLQWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQZLOOKDYHWRUHORFDWH«:HDUHFHUWDLQO\UXQQLQJ
DULVNLQIRUFLQJWKDWLVVXHDQGZH¶OOKDYHWRIRUFHWKHLVVXHLIZHDUHWRVDWLVI\WKLVWD[WKLQJ.´8.
Interview, March 2006). 
Interviews with UK research participants, both those due to stay in the UK and those in roles 
earmarked for relocation, revealed a certainty that tax was an important element in the choice over the 
ORFDWLRQRIWKHQHZKHDGRIILFH)RUH[DPSOH³7KHDQQRXQFHPHQWVD\V«7KDWRUJDQL]DWLon will be 
EDVHGLQDWD[DGYDQWDJHGORFDWLRQ\HWWREHGHFLGHG´ (UK Interview, Dec 2005) and ³If we go with 
ZKDWZHNQRZDWWKHPRPHQWZKLFKLVWKDWWKHEXVLQHVVZLOOEHUXQIURPDWD[HIILFLHQWORFDWLRQ«´ 
(UK Interview, Mar 2006). They questioned the other claimed strategic benefits, particularly the 
benefits of a shift to centralized decision-making given the country-centric nature of some of the UK 
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EUDQGVDQGWDVWHV³3HRSOHWKLQNLWLVDOODERXWFRVW«7KHUHLVDPLVXQGHUVWDQGLng by the people who 
KDYHPDGHWKHGHFLVLRQDERXWWKHQDWXUHRIWKHPDUNHW7KHUHLVDORWRIORFDOEUDQG´(UK Interview, 
March 2006). ³$WWKHHQGRIWKHGD\« DEXVLQHVVVWDQGVRUIDOOVRQLWVSHRSOH0D\EH,¶PEHLQJWRR
SXULVW´ (UK Interview, Jun 2006)  
Phase 2: Building legitimacy and developed judgments  
This phase focuses on the legitimation process following the announcement of the actual HQ 
location in August 2006 and the commencement of the relocation. It details the attempts at building 
legitimacy for the chosen location and its implications through more detailed legitimation claims and 
other strategies including building credibility and inducements and coercion. It details the resulting 
negative UK subsidiary legitimacy judgments and how they develop.  
HQ Legitimation strategies: Building Legitimation 
 Once the decision was announced in August 2006, there was far more communication about 
the new head office and its location. HQ legitimation claims to do with the strategic business case 
were supplemented with claims that mirrored established external claims used by the local authorities 
(and others) to legitimate decisions by companies to relocate in Eurocity. These emphasized personal 
and organizational benefits.   
Insert Table 1 about here 
Legitimation claims: personal and organizational benefits. Following the announcement by 
the European President of the location of the new European head office as Eurocity in August 2006, 
the organization announcements framed the decision in terms of organizational benefits such as a 
central location with a good infrastructure, and personal benefits such as quality of life for those due 
to relocate, in addition to any financial benefits, ³The team rated [the City] highly as a headquarters 
city on several key factors, including: Ease of doing business; Quality of transportation 
LQIUDVWUXFWXUH$YDLODELOLW\DQGTXDOLW\RIKRXVLQJVFKRROVDQGRIILFHVSDFH4XDOLW\RIOLIH´Email 
Announcement, Sept 2006), and ³,W¶VWKHORFDWLRQWKDWSURYLGHVWKHPRVWEHQHILWVRIDOOORFDWLRQV
investigated based on a number of criteria, including quality of life, central location within Europe, 
KRXVLQJDQGRYHUDOOILQDQFLDODWWUDFWLYHQHVV´Employee magazine, spring 2007). 
 These communications echoed strongly the external legitimation claims in the media 
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justifying the practice of foreign companies relocating European headquarters to Eurocity, and in 
which the business and personal benefits of the location, such as quality of life, were stressed more 
than tax as the key rationale for the decision. For example, other companies locating their European 
headquarters in Eurocity argued that ³it offers access to (relevant) experts as well as a multicultural 
environment and favorable business FRQGLWLRQV«(the city is) in the center of Europe with high 
salaries and living standards.´   
Legitimation claims: strategic benefits of co-location. The claims to do with the strategic 
benefits of relocation ZHUHUHLQIRUFHGIROORZLQJWKHDQQRXQFHPHQWRIWKHQHZORFDWLRQ³I am 
convinced that this change, consolidating our headquarters in Eurocity, will strengthen our team and 
help us further accelerate the growth of our region´Email Announcement, Sept 2006). A new 
SURMHFWWRIDFLOLWDWHWKHUHORFDWLRQ³3URMHFW(XURSH´ZDVDQQRXQFHGDWWKHEuropean leadership team 
annual roadshows in early 2007 and in email and intranet communications. ³Project Europe´ was to 
realize the strategic benefits of relocation and colocation in terms of efficiency, growth, teamwork, 
FROODERUDWLRQDQGIDVWHUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ³Central location to improve effectiveness and efficiency; 
(8OHDGHUVKLSWHDP«ORFDWHGLQRQHSODFH5HSODFH³ZDVWHGWLPH´«ZLWK³TXDOLW\WLPH´VSHQWRQ
innovation and growth´European leadership team annual roadshow to UK leadership team, Feb 
DQG³European Leadership Team, marketing management and functional management 
together in a single location «with the aim of enhancing teamwork, collaboration, alignment and 
speeding-up decision making.´Email announcement, spring 2007). 
Building credibility. The senior managers also sought to build credibility for the choice of 
relocation and colocation, thURXJKHPSKDVL]LQJLPSURYHPHQWVLQEXVLQHVVUHVXOWV³we have already 
accomplished a great deal. Although there is still some way to go, our Q1 results, which saw EU 
organic growth up 2.9% on the previous year, demonstrate that the steps we are taking as the right 
ones to deliver consistent growth´1HZVOHWWHU July 2007). They pushed ahead with conviction, 
taking every opportunity to emphasize the success to date of the decision and its support from within 
WKHRUJDQL]DWLRQ³In line with our expectations, 65% of those offered to relocate to the new office 
have chosen to make the move´1HZVOHWWHU$SULO7KHQHZRIILFHLWVHOIZDVDVXFFHVV± ³a 
milestone´0HDQZKLOHWKHUHZHUHDOVRattempts to acknowledge the efforts of staff (their pain) in 
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supporting the move, we recognize ³WKHGLVORFDWLRQDQGXSKHDYDOLQPRYLQJWRDQHZORFDWLRQDQG
thank WKRVHZKRDUHUHORFDWLQJWRWKHQHZRIILFH´ (Newsletter, June 2007) 
Inducements and coercion. Following the September 2006 announcement and early 
communications of the decision, it was not just the level of communication justifying and explaining 
the decision that was stepped up through organizational announcements and intranet information. 
Formal processes were put in place to facilitate the relocation of staff. Staff who needed to relocate, 
both those who were informed of the need to relocate when taking up their roles in the new structure 
at the end of 2005 and those only recently informed of the implications of the chosen location, had to 
fill in a form. Those who were not willing or did not want to relocate had to say so, take an exit 
package and leave so that someone else willing to live in Eurocity could be appointed or recruited to 
that role. The need to respond to this ultimatum in a relatively short period of time carried a threat and 
was to some extent coercive, but typically exit brought with it a good package. The emphasis was on 
inducements. 7KRVHWDNLQJWKHµVHULRXVO\FRQVLGHULQJLW¶RUµ\HV¶RSWLRQVZHUHLQYLWHGRQDYLVLWWR
look at the new offices and the area and discuss housing and school opportunities. For example, one 
8.PDQDJHUFRPPHQWHG³6RWKH\¶UHVD\LQJLW¶VDOOUHDG\VR\RXFDQFRPHZKHQHYHU\RXOLNHDQG
ZK\GRQ¶W\RXFRPHIRURQHGD\RUIRUGLQQHURUPD\EHWZRGD\VDZHHN$QGWKHQZH¶OOJRRXWIRU
GLQQHUPD\EHKDYHDORRNURXQG$QGWKHQWKHRWKHUELWLVWKH\WKLQNWRJHW«WRJXDUDQWHHRXU
children places in the best schools we should sign them up now´8.,QWHUYLHZ, May 2007). 
UK Response: Developed Legitimacy Judgments 
The legitimacy judgments of the UK subsidiary revealed a strong temporal dimension, 
whereby evaluations of early legitimation claims are not forgotten and influence subsequent 
instrumental, relational, and moral judgments, leading to internal legitimacy conflict. These subsidiary 
legitimacy judgments show that senior manager legitimation strategies failed to build legitimacy not 
just at the instrumental, but also at the relational and moral level.   
Insert Table 2 about here 
Evaluations of instrumental legitimacy: business implications. Following the announcement 
of the head office location, evaluations of instrumental legitimacy in terms of business implications 
became more negative. This was a period in which decisions had to be made about relocations and 
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individuals began to choose whether they would move. There was significant questioning of 
organizational impacts, such as loss of talent and business knowledge, as individuals chose to take 
exit packages instead of relocating, and concerns about the impact of this on the ability to make 
appropriate decisions for local country-based brands. There was, for example, increasing speculation 
in the UK around the potential numbers refusing to relocate³I think the business is naïve to think that 
RQO\ILIW\SHUFHQWRIWKHSHRSOHZRQ¶WJR,WKLQNLW¶VJRLQJWREHKLJKHU$QGWKH\¶UHJRLQJWRKDYHWR
work damn hard to retain the people they do´8.,QWHUYLHZ1RY&RQFHUQVZHUHDERXWD
³skills drain´ as ³they will lose a huge number of people and a huge amount of experience.  And we 
already see that with certainly from the UK very few people.  But when I talk to my counterparts in 
other countries it is a similar story.´8.Interview, Jun 2007). Individuals were openly questioning 
the extent to which there was a match between the new organization structure driven by the relocation 
and colocation decision and the declared organization strategy, questioning the ability of a centralized 
structure to make appropriate local decisions once those with local knowledge had left, ³,WKLQNLW¶V
PDGLW¶VDEVROXWHO\PDGLVQ¶WLW:K\the hell would you want to be marketing (a local brand) out of 
(XURFLW\ZKHQ\RX¶YHJRW«LW¶VRQO\DORFDOEUDQG´ (UK Interview, Jun 2007). 
The conviction from early 2006 that the decision was strongly influenced by cost efficiencies 
and tax remained, and was strengthened by experiences of Project Europe, ³Yeah. I mean on meetings 
,VLWLQLW¶VRYHUUXQZLWKWD[SHRSOH«UHDOO\LW¶VDOOGRZQWRDWD[GHFLVLRQ´8.,QWHUYLHZ-XQ
2007). The case for the other claimed strategic benefits was weak, ³Eurocity is not a bad place to be 
,¶PVXUHEXWWKHPRWLYDWLRQKDVJRWYHU\OLWWOH,¶PVXUHWRGRZLWKLWVIDQWDVWLFVXLWDELOLW\DVDZRUOG
class city and much more to do with the business benefits that come with it.´8.,QWHUYLHZ)HE
2007) 
Evaluations of instrumental legitimacy: negative family and career implications. For those 
due to relocate, from early on in 2006, legitimacy judgments also included speculation about the 
personal impact. For those in jobs who knew their position was due for relocation (e.g., senior 
marketing managers now in the marketing structure) there were very personal concerns about 
LPSOLFDWLRQVIRUIDPLOLHVVXFKDVSDUWQHUV¶FDUHHUVDQGWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVIRULQFRPHDQGWKHVHJUHZ
RQFHWKHORFDWLRQZDVNQRZQ³<RXKDYHWRDVVXPHWKDWP\KXVEDQGFDQ¶WJHWDMREEHFDXVHKHFDQ¶W
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speak the language  6RZH¶GORVHKDOIRXULQFRPHDQG\RXNQRZVRDUH\RXJRLQJWRFRPSHQVDWH
PHZLWKKDOIP\LQFRPHZLWK\RXNQRZDLQFUHDVHLQP\LQFRPH"2IFRXUVH\RX¶UHQRt´8.
Interview, Aug 2006).  
As individuals had to decide whether to relocate once the actual choice of location had been 
made towards the end of 2006 and into 2007, individuals typically expressed more significant 
negative assessments of the personal benefits arising from the move, in contrast to the positive 
EHQHILWVFODLPHGE\VHQLRU(XURSHDQPDQDJHUV7KHVHDVVHVVPHQWVUHODWHGLQSDUWLFXODUWRSDUWQHUV¶
careers, language difficulties, DQGFKLOGUHQ¶VVFKRROLQJ³6RWKDW¶VWKH\RXNQRZDQGDOOWKHIDPLly 
VWXIIP\ZLIH¶VFDUHHULVJRLQJTXLWHZHOODQGWKDWLVWDNLQJRIIVRZH¶YHJRWDOOWKDWWRFRQVLGHU
really.  The kids are very happy, very settled, doing very well in school´8.,QWHUYLHZ1RY
A move to Eurocity also had negative career implications related to becoming a global assignee. 
Previously global assignments were rewarded with a return by the individual to their home country in 
a more senior position. Now a move to Eurocity appeared to be a permanent, life-changing decision, 
³In the oOGGD\V«ZKHQ,ZHQWH[-SDWLWZDV«,ZHQWLQZLWKWKHIXOONQRZOHGJHWKDWLW¶VWZRRUWKUHH
\HDUVDQG,¶OOEHEDFNQRZWKH\¶UHDVNHG«JRWREurocity, become localized in Eurocity and then 
your career path will move round outside of the UK.  So yRX¶UHVRUWRIVD\LQJPRYHP\IDPLO\
forever´8.,QWHUYLHZ-XQH  
Evaluations of relational legitimacy: poor treatment of individuals and poor outcomes 
More fundamentally, the UK subsidiary judgments were being influenced by the actions of European 
HQ managers as much as their legitimation claims. It was perceived that the actions being taken to 
support people in relocation decisions failed to treat individuals with respect or provide outcomes or 
support commensurate with their entitlement, given the level of upheaval involved. This led to a lack 
of relational legitimacy for the new head office decision. As the European managers developed their 
approach to relocation of the head office in Eurocity from the end of 2006 and into 2007, and pushed 
ahead with conviction in the face of individuals choosing not to relocate, individuals believed that the 
(XURSHDQPDQDJHUVZHUHDGRSWLQJDµhard-QRVHG¶ DSSURDFK³my boss says he has a pile of CVs on his 
desk of talented people wanting to move to Eurocity ... I WKRXJKWWKDWZDV« VOLJKWO\LQVHQVLWLYH«KH
was telling people that he could do without them´8.,QWHUYLHZ-XQH,WZDVVDLGWKDWWKHUH
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ZDVD³JURZLQJFXOWXUHRIµZHZLOOGRWKLV¶´UHJDUGOHVVRIHPSOR\HHFRQFHUQVZKLFKLQGLFDWHGWKDWWKH
European managers were putting cost savings before people, which could only be negative for the 
RUJDQL]DWLRQ7KHGHFLVLRQZDV³agonizing´IRULQGLYLGXDOV, ³The company is playing a tough love 
VWUDWHJ\ZLWKWKHPKHUH¶VWKHGHDOWDNHLWRUOHDYHLW´8.,QWHUYLew, Nov 2006).  
In addition, it was thought that the relocation process left individuals, if they made the choice 
to relocate, with poor outcomes and recompense for what they would be doing to support the 
company. For example, there was no relocation assisWDQFHIRUWKHSDUWQHUVRIWKRVHUHORFDWLQJ³if 
\RX¶UHWKHVHQLRUEUDQGPDQDJHUKHUHDQG\RXUspouse has got a job of equal standing or better, then 
\RX¶YHJRWWRSURYLGHKHOSIRUWKHPWREHDEOHWRUHORFDWHDQGILQGMREV´8.,QWHUYLHZ)HE
The SDFNDJHVRQRIIHUGLGQRWFRPSHQVDWHIRUWKHXSKHDYDO³DOOWKDWSDLQDQGIDPLO\JULHI«IRUD
financially neutral position.  No way´8.,QWHUYLHZ)HE$OVRfor some the need to move 
showed no consideration for the family of those relocating, ³80% of my responsibility remains in the 
8.«6R,¶YHVDLG,GRQ¶WJHWWKLV,¶YHJRWWRPRYHP\ZKROHIDPLO\WREurocity, from the UK, to 
spend a few days a week back in the UK. ´8.,QWHUYLHZ)HE 
Evaluations of moral legitimacy: profits before employee welfare. As the relocation process 
proceeded, and the impact of the decision was increasingly felt in the UK, negative judgments were 
strengthened, not just by issues of relational legitimacy, but also moral legitimacy as individuals made 
values based judgments. Concerns grew that the move was primarily about costs and this meant that 
SURILWVZHUHEHLQJSXWEHIRUHRWKHULVVXHVVXFKDVHPSOR\HHZHOIDUH³I just think structuring your 
business around «efficiency first, consumers, customers, employees are you know, playing second 
fiddle to P&L management´8.,QWHUYLHZ1RYDQG³,W¶VWKHSHRSOHD[LVZHDUHLQYROYHG
in a corporate cost saving relocation exercise «µiW¶VRND\WRORVHRIWKHVHSHRSOH¶7KDW¶VDQRW
a message I enjoy as a business.´)RFXV*URXS, Jun 2007). 
Alternative explanations for the decision were voiced. Experiential evidence was cited in 
support of the belief that the move to and centralization in Eurocity was about a cost-based strategy, 
in other words, about saving money and building short-term profit rather than investing in the future 
potential of the business or in people, ³,¶PQRWVXUSULVHGSHRSOHLQWKHEXVLQHVVVHH«ZKDW¶V
happening as a milk strategy, because they see a lot of things being based on saving money.´8.
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Interview, Jun 2007).  
Phase 3: Reinforcing Legitimacy and Moving On 
The third and final phase has to do with moving on in the face of a lack of success in building 
legitimacy to date, and continuing hostility to the decision. European HQ managers focused on 
attempts to reinforce legitimacy. There was absolute consistency in legitimation claims with 
reframing of benefits and costs in a way that developed a coherent story of the organizational benefits, 
and the relocation and associated changes as a logical extension of the strategic business model for a 
responsible corporation. However, the employees in the UK subsidiary continued to question the 
strategic rationale for the relocation and colocation, persisting with the evaluation that it was all to do 
with various forms of cost savings, with poor outcomes for those who did relocate. Importantly, a 
sense of inevitability also emerged. This sense of inevitability was accompanied by their own 
understanding of plausible (alternative) explanations for the decision in terms of cost savings, and a 
certain cynicism about the changes. We show how these responses enabled the organization to move 
on through employee coping and complying, despite a lack of full scale legitimacy.  
HQ Legitimation Strategies: Reinforcing Internal Legitimation 
Legitimation claims to do with a business improvement project. During this time, HQ 
legitimation claims were reframed$SSHDOVRQWKHEDVLVRISHUVRQDOLPSOLFDWLRQVVXFKDVµTXDOLW\RI
OLIH¶largely disappeared. Instead, communications developed the previously claimed strategic 
rationale into a more coherent story. There was increasing consistency in the legitimation claims 
being communicated in different channels. Claims regarding the strategic rationale for the move and 
its delivery of desired strategic benefits were strengthened and featured more prominently in 
communications. Communications and announcements focused increasingly on the new HQ and 
3URMHFW(XURSHDVSULPDULO\D³EXVLQHVVLPSURYHPHQWSURMHFW´³Setting strategy in Eurocity and 
implementing it effectively in markets adds up to a winning combination which will benefit our 
customer, our consumer ± DQGXV´(Email Communication, March 2008) 
Insert Table 3 about here 
Legitimation claims to do with being a responsible corporation. The tax issue raised by 
employees was very clearly acknowledged³There is a potential tax benefit ... but tax is not the 
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primary reason we need Project Europe´Email Communication, March 2008), but the focus was 
placed on the need to do business differently to support the new marketing structure, and Project 
Europe as a business improvement project. The company was demonstrating the characteristics 
expected of a responsible corporation, for example, in the same communication, ³QRWHYDOXDWLQJ
potential tax implications of our business decisions would simply be LUUHVSRQVLEOH´ 
Claiming success and coercion. Legitimation claims continued to focus on building 
FUHGLELOLW\WKURXJKGUDZLQJRQHQGRUVHPHQWE\UHVXOWV³:HVKRXOGDOOEHSURXGRIODVW\HDU¶VQHDU
4% top line growth.´Email Communication, April 2008). Furthermore, they engaged in stronger 
coercion. The relocate or exit stance was softened a little with some individuals given more flexibility 
to stay in their home country but commute for some of the time. However, the organization had been 
frequently recruiting directly to Eurocity to replace those who did not want to relocate and were 
taking exit packages. These new individuals, notably, did not question the strategic business case for 
the chosen location. Furthermore, they rejected the argument that those based in Eurocity could not 
PDNHJRRGGHFLVLRQVERWKDWD(XURSHDQOHYHODQGORFDOO\³,W¶VQRWWUXH6RUU\IODWRXWLW¶VQRWWUXH
7KDW¶VDQDUURJDQWEHKDYLRU3HRSOHDUHSHRSOHWKHSV\FKRORJLFDOSURFHVVHVZHJRWKURXJKDUH
absolutely identical´1HZ(XURSHDQHQ manager, June 2008). 
UK Response: Moving on: Rationalized Judgments and a Sense of Inevitability 
Evaluations of Instrumental legitimacy: questioning the business case. The UK staff 
continued to question the strategic benefits, raising issues with the loss of knowledge and expertise, 
resulting in a lack of effectiveness for the business³one would hope that in Eurocity they will have 
skilled and knowledgeable people «,¶PQRWFRQILGHQWWKH\¶UHILQGLQJWKDW ... My experience of some 
of the people in my function in EurocityWKH\¶YHMXVWMRLQHG%UDQGCo7KH\GRQ¶WNQRZPXFKDERXW
the business.  So they have quite a bit to learn´8.,QWHUYLHZ)HE7KHperception remained 
that it was all about cost savings rather than any other claimed benefits, and thus would not lead to 
good results for the business, ³(YHU\ERG\LQWKHZRUOGNQRZVLW¶VDcost saving project and we pretend 
LW¶VVRPHWKLQJHOVHEHFDXVHWKHPRYHWRcentralized marketing LVQ¶WDFWXDOO\GRQHWKHZD\WKH\DUH
doing it´8.,QWHUYLHZ, Apr 2008).   
Insert Table 4 about here 
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Evaluations of relational legitimacy: poor outcomes. There were more evaluations to do 
with poor outcomes for those who did relocate, which did not match what had been promised or 
compensate for the upheaval, such as an unattractive working environment in the new head office, 
³LW¶VQRWDSDUWLFXODUO\WHPSWLQJHQYLURQPHQWDWWKHPRPHQWEHFDXVHLWGRHVQ¶WVHHPOLNH«D
fantastically great place to work. And yet it was sold as a great work-OLIHEDODQFH«ZKHQ,JRWKHUH
,¶PQRWOLNHZRZJHWPHKHUHQRZ(UK Interview, Nov 2007) DQG³LW¶VQRWDYHU\DWWUDFWLYHSODFHWR
be ... We did some nice things but the office is soulless.´8.,QWHUYLHZ)HE. 
Complying: Accepting inevitability. Alongside these legitimacy judgments, a new sense of 
inevitability pervaded the UK concerning the move to Eurocity and the outcome of the changes. 
Judgments to do with moral legitimacy appeared to be replaced by an acceptance that the very 
business model they wanted to reject was going to happen. There was an acceptance of the cost saving 
motive as a fact ± what was happening was going to happen. The relocation and new European 
structure was needed to deliver the efficiency savings, despite the perceived negative consequences, 
so the UK had no choice in the matter: ³7KHSURILOHLW¶VJRWDOOWKHZD\XSIURPWKHWRSRQWKLVDV
being one region, and you can see LWLQWKHSUHVVWKDWZH¶YHVHWXSWKHKHDGTXDUWHUVDQGDOOWKLVVR,
think it will be forced upon [us].´ (Focus Group, Aug 2008). The UK was now part of an integrated 
European operation driven by an organization wanting efficiency gains through centralization and 
ORFDWLRQ³,W
VDERXWD(XURSHDQFRPSDQ\DQGZHKDYHWRDFFHSWWKDW«<HDKDQG,WKLQNWKDW
VRQHRI
the things´)RFXV*URXS, $XJ$QG³«ZH¶UHPRYLQJWR(XURFLW\DQG,IHHOWKDWXOWLPDWHO\ZH
will be a distributor who executes within those parameters´8.,QWHUYLHZ)HE 
Coping: Cynicism. Alongside the sense of inevitability, there was also evidence of cynicism 
DERXWVHQLRUPDQDJHUV¶OHJLWLPDtion claims. The cynicism appeared to be a form of cognitive 
dissonance reduction, enabling the UK to accept the decision through alternative explanations as to 
why it was really happening and why it was therefore inevitable. The cynicism manifested itself in the 
UK through increasing mockery of, and a black humor about, the claimed logic for the relocation to 
Eurocity and the associated changes, ³If you want to be close to your customers and your consumers 
you ought to be in the country where your customers and your consumers are ... Not in Eurocity 
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where «\RX¶YHJRWPRUHELOOLRQDLUHVSHUsquare kilometer than anywhere else in the world.´(UK 
Interview, Apr 2008).  
This cynicism seemed to stem in part from perceived contradictions between the legitimation 
claims and actions of the European managers. The UK continued to cite tangible experiences of the 
cost saving practices of the European managers, with no tangible evidence of the promised investment 
LQJURZWKDVZRXOGVXSSRUWWKHFODLPHGVWUDWHJLFEHQHILWV³What we see is a raft of announcements 
every few weeks of more reorganization and FXWVHWFHWHUDEXW,FDQ¶WTXLWHVHHWKHGHOLYHU\´8.
Interview, Feb 2008). And ³$QGWKHQ\RXVD\ZKDW¶VUHDOO\LQFUHDVHGLQIRFXVLV3URMHFW(XURSH«
Will LWVHOOPRUHER[HV«PDNHXVDEHWWHUPDUNHWLQJFRPSDQ\"1RRIFRXUVHLWZRQ¶W,W¶VDERXWWKH
efILFLHQF\´ (UK Interview, Apr 2008).  Such experiences supported an alternative and coherent 
account to do with business efficiency savings, against the account promoted by the senior managers 
to do with growth, innovation and a business improvement project.  
BUILDING INTERNAL LEGITIMACY IN HQ RELOCATION: A PROCESS MODEL 
As a result of our analysis, we offer an inductively derived process model that elucidates the role of 
internal legitimacy in contentious decisions, such as HQ relocation, in MNCs. Although our case has 
specific features, our findings identify overall patterns that contribute to our understanding of how 
contentious decisions may or may not be legitimated in subsidiaries. Figure 3 below provides a 
summary of our model. Our findings reveal a clear pattern of attempts at initial legitimation when the 
decision is first communicated: this leads to early legitimacy judgments built largely on speculation. 
As details of the decision are fully formulated and implemented, this is followed by a strong focus on 
building legitimacy through a wider range of strategies, incorporating actions as well as claims. These 
strategies lead to a more developed set of increasingly negative legitimacy judgments due to the way 
the dynamics between the strategies and judgments play out within the local subsidiary context. The 
lack of achievement of legitimacy and the consequent ongoing questioning of the decision trigger the 
move to the third phase. There is a shift to reinforcing legitimacy through a set of changed 
legitimation strategies; these lead to acceptance of the changes, if not full-scale legitimacy, and hence 
allow the MNC to move on.  
Insert Figure 3 about here 
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 This model highlights two dynamics that are central to how legitimacy is built and evaluated 
for contentious decisions in MNCs. The first is a dynamic between legitimation strategies and 
legitimacy judgments. The second is a temporal dynamic in how both the legitimation strategies and 
legitimacy judgments evolve over time. These dynamics are central to how the MNC moves on from a 
lack of full legitimacy for the decision. They are also underpinned by the cross-border nature of the 
HQ relocation decision. In what follows we unpack these two dynamics and also highlight how the 
MNC context influenced them. 
The Dynamic between Legitimation Strategies and Legitimacy Judgments 
The first dynamic of note is between legitimation strategies and legitimacy judgments (marked by 
arrows between the two in Figure 3). We build understanding of the dynamic between legitimation 
strategies and legitimacy judgments by drawing on a social psychological approach to legitimacy 
(Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011) to highlight the role of instrumental, relational, and moral 
aspects of legitimacy judgments. In addition, we find that the MNC context, the cross-border nature of 
the HQ relocation decision, with nation-based winners and losers, significantly affects the interplay 
between HQ legitimation strategies and subsidiary instrumental, relational and moral legitimacy 
judgements. 
Issues of instrumental legitimacy relate to both overall strategic considerations and family and 
career implications. These are heightened by the MNC decision-making context. The family and 
career implications that influence judgments of instrumental legitimacy include language and 
schooling issues that impact opportunities for spouses and children in ways that would not arise for 
within nation moves. Other issues of instrumental legitimacy relate to the shifts in subsidiary mandate 
caused by the relocation. Issues of instrumental legitimacy are also linked with relational legitimacy 
in terms of how sympathetically they are dealt with. Action based strategies, such as use of 
inducements and coercion, are important in relational judgments: HQ managers are evaluated not just 
against what they claim, but against what they do in respect of individual concerns. We see this 
particularly in the second phase as individuals have to make difficult choices.  
We also identify how the evaluation of legitimacy issues implies moral reflection. When 
actions are evaluated as being inconsistent with the HYDOXDWRU¶VPRUDODQGHWKLFDOYDOXHVSURILWV
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should not trump all concerns for welfare, for example) issues of moral legitimacy can result. 
Furthermore, moral issues are values based, and can therefore vary within an MNC across subsidiaries 
with different cultural scripts (Delmestri & Wezel, 2011). For example, in our case, the UK subsidiary 
valued its relatively high level of autonomy and embeddedness in the local economy. This led to 
assessments that relocation put cost savings above other considerations, irrespective of the extent to 
which this altered what had been a strength of the business, for example, local decision-making. Thus 
we provide support for those who argue that instrumental, relational, and moral views of legitimacy 
should not be considered alternative explanations for evaluations of the degree to which legitimacy is 
judged: legitimacy is evaluated on instrumental, relational, and moral bases simultaneously (Tost, 
2011). In the context of controversial decisions in MNCs we find that it is the combination of 
instrumental, relational, and moral considerations that form the roots of legitimacy conflict.  
The Temporal Evolution of Legitimacy Strategies and Judgments 
The second dynamic of note is a temporal dynamic, both in the legitimation strategies and the 
legitimacy judgments (marked by arrows between phases), whereby what happens in an earlier phase 
influences (and potentially constrains) what is done subsequently, creating a type of path dependency 
over time. The first phase, during which the decision is first communicated, involves initial 
legitimation through claims about the business case for the decision. Since specific implementation 
choices may not be complete, little else can be done. However, this leaves an exposure since once all 
decisions have been made, this may lead to modified legitimation strategies in the building phase. 
Meanwhile, early legitimacy judgments are formed only from the sketchy details of the strategic 
business case presented in the initial legitimation strategies, and specific considerations that might 
subsequently appear less appropriate ± such as the tax motive in our case. They tend to be based on 
questioning of the initial claims. These judgments nevertheless leave a memory trace or residue that 
influences later judgments developed in response to subsequent legitimation strategies.  This first 
phase is then significant for how things subsequently unfold. 
The second phase then involves building legitimation not just for the decision, but for the 
specifics of it, such as in this case the location. Early legitimation claims need to be reformed, and a 
wider spectrum of more comprehensive legitimation strategies employed, leading to more developed 
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legitimacy judgments. Our case shows how legitimation claims for the business case surrounding the 
decision may now be supplemented with general scripts or established legitimation claims that are 
frequently used by MNCs in similar situations. This may not have been possible in the first phase 
without knowledge of the specifics of the decision. However, this may result in a perceived hiding, or 
downplaying, of motives with negative implications for how internal legitimacy judgments develop. 
Efforts are also made to build credibility, underscored by the endorsement of results, acknowledging 
³WKHSDLQ´DQGSXVKLQJDKHDGZLWKFRQYLFWLRQYet as this case shows, the result may lead to use of 
legitimation strategies that do not deal directly with the sources of legitimacy conflict since they 
continue to contain elements questioned by the subsidiary in their judgments. Partly because of this, 
HQ are likely to supplement its legitimation strategies with strong inducement and coercion, which 
FDQUHVXOWLQSHUFHSWLRQRID³hard-nosHG´ approach that contributes to issues of relational and moral 
legitimacy. Such circumstances tend to result in legitimacy conflict, and possibly crisis, if the 
subsidiary judgments are overwhelmingly negative. 
It is the failure to achieve full legitimacy and the possibility of a legitimacy crisis which could 
result in negative consequences for the MNC that triggers the third phase. This phase is characterized 
by legitimation strategies designed to enable the MNC to move on by reinforcing legitimacy despite a 
lack of full-scale legitimacy in all its subsidiaries. HQ managers may seek to address some of the 
criticisms in their claims, but largely respond to any resulting conflict with what others have termed a 
³GRPLQDWLRQVWUDWHJ\´'|UUHQElFKHU	Gammelgaard, 2011), hardening their line by reframing their 
claims to develop a coherent and persistent story of a clear strategic business case. These claims need 
to be shaped by what has been said and done previously if they are not to lose face. In addition, senior 
managers may move from strategies of inducement and coercion to strategies that are more 
straightforwardly coercive, indicating that no opposition will be tolerated, such as in our case hiring 
people externally to replace those not willing to relocate. Finally, these strategies are supported by 
ongoing efforts to build credibility by continually emphasizing how successful the change has been. 
However, prior subsidiary judgments continue to influence current judgments despite new 
claims and actions: the concerns remain as the new claims and actions are unable to address them. 
Existing subsidiary values and beliefs also act as a residue, contributing to a continuation in 
34 
subsidiary judgments that are not addressed by ongoing legitimation strategies despite persistence in 
repetition, since these are an extension of previous (failed) strategies. Thus rather than producing full-
scale legitimacy, these ongoing judgments, in combination with the consistency and persistency in 
senior manager legitimation strategies in which there is no indication of any change of course, lead 
instead to a sense of inevitability. The subsidiary engages in strategies of coping and compliance 
expressed through cynicism and black humor. Cynicism and black humor are forms of cognitive 
dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957) commonly occurring in situations of change (Bacharach, 
Bamberger, & Sonnenstuhl, 1996); they allow individuals to reconcile experienced inconsistencies. 
This is underpinned by the fact that the subsidiary members can, through their cynicism, construct an 
alternative and plausible explanation for the decision in which there are advantages for the 
organization, although not necessarily the ones claimed by company managers. This resolves 
dissonance and allows the company to move on. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper has been to elucidate the role of internal legitimacy in MNCs confronted 
with contentious decisions. For that purpose, we have studied a revealing case of HQ relocation and 
on that basis developed a process model that can also, with due caution, illuminate such processes in 
other contexts. By so doing, we make three contributions to existing research. First and foremost, we 
add to previous research on legitimacy in MNCs (Delmestri & Wezel, 2011; Kostova & Roth, 2002; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 2009) by unpacking the dynamics of building internal legitimacy at the subsidiary 
level from a social psychological perspective. Second, our analysis enables us to contribute to what 
we know about the tensions that characterize HQ-subsidiary relationships and the role of legitimacy 
and power in them (Balogun et al., 2011; Clark & Geppert, 2011; Schotter & Beamish, 2011). Third, 
our study also adds to nascent research on HQ relocation (Laamanen et al., 2012). We will elaborate 
on these contributions below. 
Contributions to Research on Internal Legitimacy in MNCs 
Previous MNC research on legitimacy has focused primarily on external legitimacy (Delmestri & 
Wezel, 2011; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), which has led to 
relative oversight of internal legitimacy. In particular, we still know little about internal legitimacy 
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from the subsidiary perspective, and how MNC parents build legitimacy for their decisions with 
subsidiaries, even though this is likely to be a crucial issue when MNCs deal with contentious 
decisions such as HQ relocation. Our analysis is an attempt to partially fill this research gap, and the 
inductively derived process model elucidates some of the key dynamics at play. 
In particular, our paper introduces insights from social psychological approaches to 
legitimacy (Bitektine, 2011; Bitektine & Haack, 2015; Tost, 2011) into research on legitimacy in the 
MNC context, which has thus far been dominated by institutional approaches. The social 
psychological approach enables us to focus on subsidiary legitimacy judgments and the dynamic 
relationship between HQ legitimation strategies and subsidiary legitimacy judgments through 
evaluations in terms of instrumental, relational, and moral legitimacy. This helps us to understand the 
³RWKHUVLGHRIWKHFRLQ´WKDWKDVEHHQODUJHO\PLVVLQJLQSUHYLRXVLQWHUQDWLRQDOEXVLQHVVUHVHDUFKRQ
legitimacy: the perspective of the subsidiary rather than the perspective of external stakeholders. In 
addition, our analysis unravels the various ways in which these judgments may or may not be 
successfully steered by HQ legitimation strategies. Furthermore, the social psychological approach 
helps to understand how moving on is enabled without full legitimacy for a decision. This is at least in 
part due to cognitive dissonance reduction (Festinger, 1957) in and through means such as cynicism 
and black humor.  
Finally, our analysis reveals the inherent problems that external legitimation poses for internal 
legitimacy in MNCs, adding to research on the complexities and dynamics of legitimacy and 
legitimation in the MNC context (Kostova & Roth, 2002; Kostova et al., 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). As our case vividly illustrates, strategies used to legitimate externally, in which claims draw on 
existing scripts that have particular relevance in the locale in which the organization is relocating, 
may not generate the required levels of legitimacy internally across all subsidiaries as they may not 
have resonance with employees in other locales. 
Contributions to Research on Legitimacy and Power in HQ-Subsidiary Relationships 
It is now frequently acknowledged that changes in MNC-subsidiary relationships involve micro-
political negotiation processes involving conflict as an integral part of the subsidiary development 
process (Birkinshaw, Holm, Thilenius, & Arvidsson, 2000; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008b; 
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Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard, 2011; Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2006; Jarzabkowski & Balogun, 
2009; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Taplin, 2006). Yet with a few exceptions (e.g., Balogun et al., 2011; 
Clark & Geppert, 2011) there is a lack of understanding of how negotiation processes unfold between 
HQ managers and subsidiary managers in times of radical change. Hence our model complements not 
only models of internal legitimacy, but also studies that seek to account for how the negotiation 
processes between HQ managers and subsidiaries play out. 
In particular, although building legitimacy across all subsidiaries affected by a parent decision 
may not be possible, the parent does need to move on in the face of conflict. Our model is revealing as 
to how this may be accomplished, showing how MNCs can move on despite a lack of full-scale 
legitimacy. Furthermore, as we argue above, legitimacy brings benefits to the study of internal 
reactions to change since it places a focus on change-agent recipient interactions in a way that avoids 
the tendency common in studies of resistance to view managers as in the right and employees as 
irrational and unnecessarily obstructive (see Huy et al., 2014). By focusing on legitimacy, we bring an 
additional dimension into consideration of the negotiation processes in the MNC-subsidiary 
relationship.  
Balogun et al. (2011) show how conflict between the center and subsidiaries can be reduced   
during change that alters the center-subsidiary dependence-independence balance through 
negotiations that involve reconciliation in which both sides make adjustments as the change process 
proceeds.  Here, in a context in which reconciliation was not possible, we uncover a different 
dynamic. Instead of legitimacy through reconciliation, our analysis reveals a specific kind of power 
dynamic that builds on reframing to ensure consistency in legitimation claims and increasing use of 
coercion on the part of HQ. This may include not just replacing people who do not actively support 
the changes, but taking the opportunity to recruit individuals from the new locale who have different 
cultural scripts or who have worked in similarly structured organizations. Engagement in strategies of 
cognitive dissonance reduction by recipients of change left with little choice in the face of 
legitimation strategies suggesting the inevitability of the decision is the key to the ³VXFFHVV,´IRUZDQW
of a better term, of this approach to legitimization, because recipients have to find a coping 
mechanism that resolves the discomfort caused by dissonance. 
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It is important to note in this the increasing consistency in claims and actions that contribute 
to a sense of inevitability, which in turn enables compliance (Clark & Geppert, 2011). Here top 
PDQDJHPHQW¶VSRZHU-based strategy, a µKDUG-QRVHG¶DSSURDFKLQZKLFKWKH\toughen their line, had a 
major impact on the sense of inevitability. The fact that the subsidiary members could still express 
their evaluations of a lack of legitimacy for the decisions through cynicism in their own discourse 
appears to have enabled them to distance themselves from the decision and its implications, so that 
they could move on and comply. Our case clearly shows how this discourse that criticized the 
decision was a major coping mechanism that allowed the subsidiary managers and employees to deal 
with the ramifications of the controversial decision. 
Contributions to Research on HQ Relocation 
Finally, our analysis adds to research on HQ relocation. HQ relocation has become an important topic 
in its own right in International Business research (Laamanen et al., 2012). Our analysis contributes to 
this new stream of research by adopting a subsidiary perspective from which national and local issues 
are highlighted in addition to global or international concerns. Our analysis deepens understanding of 
how HQ relocation decisions cause disruptions in HQ-subsidiary relationships, and lead to 
reformulations of subsidiary roles and identities, and how all this involves sociopolitical processes 
and dynamics that should be taken seriously if we are to understand the longer-term, multifaceted 
implications of HQ relocation decisions. In particular, our analysis highlights the struggles over 
legitimacy that HQ relocation decisions often lead to, as well as how subsidiary managers and 
employees can cope with and move on from decisions that are not as such perceived as legitimate.  
Limitations and Future Research 
This analysis has limitations that should be taken seriously when interpreting the findings. The 
specific nature of the legitimation dynamics depend on the industrial and cultural context, and our 
case has its idiosyncratic features. For instance, the UK setting may emphasize a cultural or 
institutional tendency to value the autonomy or independence of the subsidiary more than would be 
the case in other contexts. It is also likely that depending on their mandate, subsidiaries may be more 
or less resistant to HQ relocation. In our case, the mandate of the UK subsidiary was challenged by 
the relocation. In other cases, the reactions could be different. Thus future research should analyze the 
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differences in legitimacy judgments within and across subsidiaries since people may experience 
relocations in very different ways depending on their background, position and, for example, national 
origin. It is also important to examine the dynamics of internal legitimation in MNCs for contentious 
decisions other than HQ relocations, and to focus particularly on the legitimation dynamics uncovered 
in this context. Our findings require much greater scrutiny in different contexts to build our 
understanding of the relationship within and between legitimation strategies and legitimacy judgments 
in MNCs over time, and how this may lead to particular patterns in strategies for moving on. 
Future research could go further in exploring the micro-level dynamics, for instance by 
focusing on particular messages or arguments coming from HQ and examining how they are 
perceived in subsidiaries. This would shed more light on how legitimacy judgments are formed at the 
very micro-level and how this varies in an MNC context in comparison to, for example, more 
straightforward national contexts lacking the complexities of multiple industrial and cultural contexts. 
In addition, future studies could explore in more detail the various micro-level rhetorical strategies 
that may be used to achieve inevitability and examine more closely how the inevitability judgments of 
employees may change over time and the implications of these for the longer term. Future studies 
could also draw from other social psychological theories ± such as procedural justice or distributive 
justice (Kim & Mauborgne 1993; Monin, Noorderhaven, Vaara, & Kroon, 2013) ± and combine their 
insights to develop a more elaborate understanding of the different aspects of legitimacy judgments in 
MNCs. In all, future studies should build on the use of the social psychological approach to advance 
our understanding of legitimacy in MNCs and international business.    
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Figure 1: A Timeline of Events 
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2005 2006 2007 2008 
End of 2005 
Changes announced, 
including new strategy 
and structure, key senior 
appointments at both 
European and subsidiary 
level, and intent to 
identify new head office 
location  
End of 2005 to mid-
2006 
Implementation of 
changes begins as 
individuals take up 
new roles and new 
regional structures 
start to form along 
with new related 
processes. Search 
for new head office 
location ongoing. 
August 2006 
New Head 
Office 
location 
announced 
in Eurocity. 
End of 2006 and into 
2007 
Set up of new office 
commences: 
relocation team and 
plans for relocation of 
personnel established 
with a review of which 
additional roles to 
those previously in 
plan need to relocate. 
Early 2007 
Announcement of 
project to establish 
new processes and 
systems required to 
deliver integration / 
centralization of 
operations from new 
head office in 
Eurocity. 
End of 2006 and 
into mid 2007 
Those due to 
relocate need to 
make decision 
and commit to 
relocation or 
take exit 
packages. 
Mid 2007 
New office 
officially 
opened and 
relocation 
of personnel 
speeds up. 
Second half of 2007 and 
into 2008 
Impact of relocation felt 
in subsidiaries as: 
individuals relocate or 
leave, decision-making 
starts to move as 
departments / functions 
consolidate in new head 
office, and new people 
recruited straight to 
new head office to 
replace those who have 
exited. 
Figure 2: Data Coding Structure 
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3KDVH 3KDVH 3KDVH 
+4/HJLWLPDWLRQ6WUDWHJLHV 
6XEVLGLDU\/HJLWLPDF\-XGJPHQWV 
Developed Judgments 
 
Instrumental Legitimacy 
- Questioning degree of personal, 
organizational and strategic benefits 
- Questioning validity of business case & 
proposing alternative explanations for 
decision 
Relational legitimacy 
- Challenging appropriateness of process 
being used to implement decision 
Moral Legitimacy 
- Challenging decision based on its lack of 
fit with existing subsidiary values of best 
practice 
Initiating Legitimation  
 
Claims 
 
- Forming early strategic 
business case for decision 
Building Legitimation 
 
Claims 
- Strengthening case: Increasing emphasis on strategic 
business case supported by framing decision in relevant 
established country based external discourses 
Credibility 
- Endorsement by results 
- Acknowledging pain 
- Pushing ahead with conviction 
 
Inducements 
-  Offering relevant enticements to subsidiary staff to engage 
in decision supportive actions 
Early judgments 
 
Instrumental Legitimacy 
 
- Questioning validity of 
business case 
Moving On: Rationalized Judgments 
 
Instrumental Legitimacy 
- Questioning degree of organizational and 
strategic benefits 
- Questioning validity of business case & 
proposing alternative explanations for decision 
-  
Reinforcing Legitimation 
 
Claims 
- Reframing to develop coherent, consistent 
and persistent story, to do with clear 
strategic business case for  responsible 
corporation 
Credibility 
- Endorsement by results 
 
Inducements and Coercion 
- Engaging in more forceful responses to 
resistance, such as hiring external decision 
supportive people 
Relational legitimacy 
- Challenging nature of process on  
outcomes achieved 
Coping & Complying 
- Accepting inevitability 
- Cynicism
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Table 1: Building Legitimacy: Legitimation strategies 
Organizational 
benefits 
 ³&HQWUDOORFDtion: Ease of doing business; Centrally located within Europe; Quality of transportation infrastructure; Financial attractiveness´6OLGHV
µ5RDGVKRZ¶)HE 
 ³>/RFDWLRQ] was chosen based on a number of important criteria including geogrDSKLFORFDWLRQWUDQVSRUWDWLRQOLQNV«DQGEXVLQHVVWD[HV´(mail 
Announcement, Spring 2007) 
Personal benefits  ³2YHUDOOTXDOLW\RIOLIH$YDLODELOLW\DQGTXDOLW\RIKRXVLQJVFKRROVDQGUHFUHDWLRQDFWLYLWLHV2XWRIWRSLQWHUQDWLRQDO cities, ranked #1 in the 2006 
0HUFHU4XDOLW\RI/LYLQJVXUYH\´6OLGHVµ5RDGVKRZ¶)HE 
³>/RFDWLRQ@:DVFKRVHQEDVHGRQDQXPEHURILPSRUWDQWFULWHULDLQFOXGLQJ«TXDOLW\RIOLIH´&RPSDQ\LQWUDQHWLQ6SULQJ6XPPHU 
Strategic Benefits 
from relocation & 
co-location: 
Efficiency and 
Growth 
 
³2XU(8VHQLRUWHDPLVORRNLQJIRUZDUGWRHVWDEOLVKLQJDVLQJOHUHJion headquarters in Eurocity and the efficiencies that will result from having our 
WHDPVLQRQHORFDWLRQ´Email Announcement, Sept 2006) 
³SURYLGH WKHHQDEOLQJSODWIRUPZHQHHGWRDFFHOHUDWHJURZWKRIRXUEXVLQHVV´Email announcement, Feb 2007) 
³(QVXUHVWRKDYHWKH(XURSHDQOHDGHUVKLSWHDPmarketing management and functional management teams together in one location.  This is a critical 
VWHSWRHQDEOHXVWRZRUNFORVHUWRJHWKHUDQGGULYHIDVWHUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJWRGHOLYHUDJDLQVWRXUJURZWKFKDUWHU´Email Announcement, May 2007) 
Strategic Benefits 
from relocation & 
co-location: 
Teamwork, 
collaboration, 
faster decision 
making  
³2ur plans to bring the European leadership, marketing management and functional management teams together in a single location in Eurocity «7KLV
will be a critical step to enDEOHXVWRZRUNFORVHUWRJHWKHUDQGGULYHIDVWHUGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ´Email Announcement, January 2007)  
³$QLPSRUWDQWVHFRQGSKDVHRIWKHPRGHOZDVDQQRXQFHGLQWREULQJWKH(XURSHDQ/HDGHUVKLS7HDPmarketing management and functional 
management together in a single location in Eurocity with the aim of enhancing teamwork, collaboration, alignment and speeding-XSGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ´
(Company intranet in Spring / Summer 2007). 
Credibility: 
Endorsement by 
results 
³UHVXOWVLQGLFDWHZHDUHKHDGLQJLQWKH ULJKWGLUHFWLRQ´µ5RDGVKRZ¶)HE 
³7KHEXVLQHVVUHVXOWVGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWRXU(XURSHDQmarketing-OHGVWUDWHJLHVDUHDOUHDG\WDNLQJXVLQWKHULJKWGLUHFWLRQ«:HKDYHQ¶WFKRVHQDQHDV\
SDWKEXWZHEHOLHYHLWLVWKHULJKWRQH´Email announcement, April 2007) 
Credibility: 
Acknowledging 
pain 
³:HFOHDUO\DVNHGDORWRIWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQDQGDORWIURPRXUSHRSOH+RZHYHU,DPFRQYLQFHGWKDWDOOWKHHIIRUWKDVEHHQZRUWK«,FDQWHOO\RXWKDW
we improved in several areas for the first time in many \HDUV«7KLVLVDWUHPHQGRXVDFKLHYHPHQWDQG,WKDQN\RXDOOIRUWKDW´Email Communication, 
Jan 2007) 
³You have proven before that you are capable oIHPEUDFLQJFKDQJHDQG,¶PVXUH\RXZLOOULVHWRWKHQHZFKDOOHQJHVDKHDG:HKDYHQ¶WFKRVHQDQHDV\
path but we believe it is the right one. And I want you to know how much the EU Leadership Team and I appreciate your extraordinary efforts and 
FRPPLWPHQW´Email Communication, April 2007) 
Credibility: 
Pushing ahead 
with conviction 
 ³>7KH&(2@MRLQHGLQDWRXURIWKHQHZRIILFHYLVLWLQJWKHVSDFLRXVRSHQ-SODQZRUNDUHD«DQGVHHLQJILUVWKDQGDOOWKHKDUGZRUN«WKHUHZDVD
UHDOEX]]DURXQGWKHEXLOGLQJ«HQWKXVLDVPDQGH[FLWHPHQW´  (Intranet news item, June 2007) 
³7KHRIILFH«LVDPLOHVWRQH«DV>RXU&(2@QRWHGLQKLVUHPDUNVLW¶VDOUHDG\GHPRQVWUDWLQJUHVXOWV´,QWUDQHWQHZVLWHP-XQH 
 
Table 2: Establishing Legitimacy Judgments 
Instrumental legitimacy 
 
Negative family 
implications 
³:KDW GR\RXGR":KDWGR\RXGR"7KHUH¶VSHRSOHHTXDOO\VD\LQJ³2K\RX¶YHJRWWRJRWR(XURFLW\ EXWP\KXVEDQGZRUNVRUP\ZLIHZRUNV´
KRZ¶VWKDWJRLQJWRZRUN"«,W¶VDELJROGDVN´8.,QWHUYLHZ6HSW 
 ³+HFDPHWRDVNPHP\DGYLFH«+HVDLGZHOO P\ZLIHVDLGWRPHµ\RXDUHFXUUHQWO\DZD\GD\VDZHHNZKLFKLVWRXJKEXW,OLYHLQ(QJODQG
surrounded by friends, you want me to move to EurocityZLWKRXWIDPLO\ZKHUHZHNQRZQRRQHLQDIRUHLJQODQJXDJHZKLFKZHGRQ¶WVSHDN « 
and then you are goLQJWREHDZD\QLJKWVDZHHNEHFDXVHRI\RXUMRE,¶PQRWVXUHWKDW¶VVRPHWKLQJZHVKRXOGEHFRQWHPSODWLQJ¶´8.
Interview, Nov 2006) 
Negative career 
implications (need to be 
a global assignee) 
³<RXNQRZLW¶VQRWDVPDOOGHFLVLRQ,W¶VDOLIH-changing decision, because Eurocity DLQ¶WIRUWKHQH[WRUPRQWKV7KLVLVDSHUPDQHQW\RX
know, my job, I will be in Eurocity, my next job will be in Eurocity, potentially for the rest of my life. So the endgame is where you need to start 
in terms of the debate.  Do we want to spend a significant proportion of our next years in Eurocity"´8.,QWHUYLHZ1RY 
³7KHQDWXUHRIWKLVGHSDUWXUHIRUVRPHRQHDWP\OHYHOLVVXFKWKDW\RXDUHDFWXDOO\HPEDUNLQJRQDQRPDGLFFDUHHUZLWK>%UDQG&R@«6R
traditionally, whereas marketers might have traditionally been the leaders at the national level, you will probably have a better blend between sales 
and marketers doing those roles. So what they are asking you to do is to leave your country of origin, proEDEO\QHYHUUHWXUQ´8.,QWHUYLHZ)HE
2007) 
Business Implications: 
Centralization will 
cause attrition 
 
³<HVWKHDWWULWLRQUDWHQXPEHUVWKDWDUHFRPLQJRXWIURPEurocity VHHPWR«WKH\¶UHSUREDEO\UXQQLQJZKLFKis SKHQRPHQDO,GRQ¶WNQRZ
how, to EHKRQHVWWKHEXVLQHVVFDQPDQDJHZLWKWKDWNLQGRIDWWULWLRQUDWH´8.,QWHUYLHZ1RY 
³I am worried about how many people we will lose here ... particularly if you are a woman, with young kids and a husband working, here in the 
UK ...  they are going to be surprised.  About the number people saying thanks, but no thanks.  (UK Interview, Nov 2006) 
Business Implications: 
Centralization will 
cause loss of business 
knowledge 
 
³7KDW¶VJRLQJWREH\RXUSUREOHPDQGWKHWRSPDQDJHPHQWDUHQ¶WVHHLQJWKDWDWWKHPRPHQW7KH\¶UHQRWVHHLQJWKHORVVRIVNill drain:H¶YHJRW
people in jobs ± I went to XX¶VPHHWLQJ± ZH¶YHJRWSHRSOHLQMREV,ZRXOGQ¶WHYHQJLYHWKHPWKHPRVWEDVLFMob here.  I mean, really worryingly 
not great people´8.,QWHUYLHZ1RY 
³,WKLQNWKHUHLVFRQFHUQWKDWDORWRISHRSOHDUHQ¶WJRLQJDQGZKDWVRUWRIHIIHFWWKDW¶VJRLQJWRKDYHRQWKHEXVLQHVVLI\RX¶UHORVLQJDORWRIKLJK
level experienced peoplHDQGMXVWSXUHO\EHFDXVHWKH\ZRQ¶WPRYHWR(XURFLW\«DUHZHDFWXDOO\JRLQJWREHDEOHWRUHSODFHWKHLUNQRZOHGJHDQG
WKHLUH[SHULHQFH,VLWJRLQJWRKDYHDQLPSDFWRQWKHEXVLQHVV"´)RFXV*URXS-XQ 
Efficiency savings the 
real motive  
³,GRQ¶W think that came across yesterday.  I mean I get the impression that we chose Eurocity EHFDXVHLW¶VWKHZRUOG¶VQXPEHURQHFLW\,WKLQNZH
all know, we chose Eurocity EHFDXVHLW¶VJRWILQDQFLDOEHQHILWVIRUXVDVDQRUJDQL]DWLRQ´8.,QWHUYLHZFeb 2007)   
³:K\WKH\¶UHGRLQJWKLVLVSXUHO\IRUHIILFLHQF\JDLQVQRWKLQJHOVH´)RFXV*URXS-XQ 
Relational Legitimacy  
Poor treatment of 
individuals 
³7KLVLVWKHQHUYRXVQHVV\RXVHHRQFH\RX¶UHDVNHG\RXHLWKHUJRRU\RX¶UHRXWWKHGRRU«,¶YH got until 15th December, I have to say I am 
definitely not, or I might be, I am seriously thinking about it, you have to tick one of those boxes.  Then you go for your oULHQWDWLRQYLVLW´8.
Interview, Nov 2006)   
³,WKLQNWKHFRPPHQWDOVRDERXWWKHODFNRIHPSKDVLVRQVRIWVWXIIZDVDOVRZLWKEurocity, you know, people saying well «LW¶VDERXWQXPEHUV
WKDWWKHLPSDFWRQSHRSOHV¶OLYHV,I\RXDFWXDOO\KDYHWRWDNH\RXUIDPLOLHVWRWKLVKXJH«DQGWKDWGRHVQ¶WVHHPWREHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQW´8.
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Interview, Nov 2006)  
Poor outcomes for 
those who move 
³,I«\RXNQRZit could well be men who now, you know, strangely enough have professional wives.  So if you move the man in the career, there 
LV«WKHUHVKRXOGEHQRH[SHFWDWLRQVWKDWWKHZRPHQMXVWNLQGRIJRKDKDKD,¶OOMXVWJLYHXSP\xx thousand pound a year job and come and be a 
wife in Eurocity (UK Interview, Feb 2007) 
³7KHILQDQFLDOSDFNDJHRIIHUHGLVVXSSRVHGWRHTXDOL]HZKDWVRPHRQHJHWVLQWKHLUKRPHFRXQWU\6R,¶PVWDUWLQJIURPDSRLQW ± ILQHILUVW,GRQ¶W
even buy that assumption.  If you want people to leave their country of origin indefinitely, and make this an enormous success, you should be 
VHHNLQJWRLQFHQWLYL]HSHRSOH\RXVKRXOGQ¶WKDYHVXFKVWULQJHQWUXOHVLQSODFH0RUHLPSRUWDQWO\P\EORRG\EDODQFHVKHHWGRHVQ¶WHYHQDGKHUHWR
your rule!  It sKRXOGDWOHDVWEHILQDQFLDOO\QHXWUDO´8.,QWHUYLHZ)HE 2007) 
Moral Legitimacy  
Profits before employee 
welfare 
³,WZRUULHVPHWKDW\RXFDQVD\ZH¶UHMXVWSUHSDUHGWRORVHIRUW\ILIW\RUVL[W\SHUFHQWRIWKRVHSHRSOHZHFDQMXVWDIIRUGWo do that.  Then you see 
WKHSUHVHQWDWLRQVµWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWWKLQJLQWKLVFRPSDQ\DUHRXUSHRSOH¶´8.,QWHUYLHZ1RY 
³,WKLQNDERXWWKHPRYHWREurocity, tKHQXPEHURISHRSOHPRYLQJDQGLW¶VMXVWEHHQKDQGOHGUHDOO\DVWKRXJKSHRSOHDUHUHVRXUFHV7KH\did 
UDWKHUVDUFDVWLFDOO\VD\WKHZKROHUHVWUXFWXULQJNLQGRIWKHSHRSOHDJHQGDVHHPVWRKDYHEHHQVRORZGRZQ´8.,QWHUYLHZNov 2006) 
A cost-based strategy ³(YHU\RQHUHFRJQL]HVWKDWWKHUHPD\EHVRPHLPSDFWRQGHFLVLRQPDNLQJDQGHIIHFWLYHQHVVDWORFDOOHYHOEXWVRFRPSHOOLQJLVthe cost saving, that 
they are prepared to do it.  Which to me means your strategy for Europe is milk ± maximize cash input, maximize cash.  (UK Interview, Nov 
2006) 
  
Table 3: Reinforcing Legitimacy: Legitimation strategies 
Strategic Benefits: A 
business improvement 
project 
 
³This is a business improvement project in support of the marketing-led business model, one we have to ± and want to ± implement to align how 
we work with the new marketing-GULYHQEXVLQHVVPRGHO«ZH¶UHVWDQGDUGL]LQJDQGKDUPRQL]LQJRXUSURFHVVHVDFURVVIXQFWLRQVDQGDFURVVWKH
(8«Email Communication, Jan-Feb 2008) 
 ³:e are not taking on any Phase of (our strategy) only for tax reasons.  This is the way we in the EU implement the global strategy to provide 
profitable, sustainable gURZWK´Email Communication, March 2008)  
Strategic Benefits: 
Justifying Tax 
³3URMHFW(XURSH«LQFOXGHVWKHFKDQJHVUHTXLUHGIRU>%UDQG&R] WREHFRPHD(XURSHDQ2SHUDWLQJ&RPSDQ\«OHJDOO\DQGRUJDQL]DWLRQDOO\´
(Email Communication, Jan-Feb 2008) 
 ³2QFHZHGHFLGHGWRDGRSWDmarketing-led business model and to bring our EU management team together in one place, we were, of course, 
free to FKRRVHWKHEHVWORFDWLRQ,QRXUILUVWXSGDWHLQHDUO\ZHOLVWHG³EXVLQHVVWD[HV´DVRQHRIWKHFULWHULDZHXVHGWRPDNe that decision.  
[Brand Co] is a publicly held company and not evaluating potential tax implications of our business decisions would simply be irresponsible´
(Email Communication, March 2008) 
Credibility: 
Endorsement by 
results 
³2XUEXVLQHVVUHVXOWVRQH\HDUODWHUFRQILUPWKDW RXUVWUDWHJ\LVDZLQQLQJEXVLQHVVPRGHO«,DPFRQILGHQWWKDWZHDUHFUHDWLQJDPRUH
HIILFLHQWHIIHFWLYHZLQQLQJRUJDQL]DWLRQ´Email announcement, October 2007) 
³2XUUHFHQWEXVLQHVVUHVXOWVGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWZHDUHPRYLQJLQWKHULJKWGLUHFWLRQ´Email Communication, Nov 2007) 
 
  
Table 4: Moving on: Legitimacy Judgments 
Instrumental Legitimacy  
Business Implications: 
Centralization will cause 
loss of business 
knowledge 
 
³/ast year from a marketing perspective they were being run by UK employees who knew the market well, and now both those marketing 
departments DUHEHLQJUXQE\SHRSOH(XURFLW\EDVHGZKRDUHQ¶WIURPWKH8.ZKRGRQ¶WKDYHVRPXFKXQGHUVWDQGLQJof the UK market ... 
5XQQLQJLWIURPWKHGLVWDQFHDQGZLWKRXWNQRZLQJWKHORFDOPDUNHWVRZHOO´ (Focus Group, Apr 2008) 
³,WIHHOVOLNHZH¶UHKDYLQJWRUH-educate somebody every other week ...  ZKHWKHUWKH\¶UH)UHQFKRU*HUPDQRUZKDWHYHU\RX¶UHWHQGLQJto have to 
JRWKURXJKWKHZKROHµ/HWPHH[SODLQWR\RXZKDWit LVOLNH¶6RLW¶VQRWMXVWWKDWWKH\¶UHQHZSHRSOHWKDW\RX¶UHEXLOGLQJDUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKLQ
EXVLQHVVWHUPVWKHLUVWDUWLQJSRLQWLVTXLWHGLIIHUHQWµ:KDWGR,H[SHFW",¶YHZRUNHGLQWKLVPDUNHWDQGLW¶VJRLQJWRORRNOLNHWKLVLVQ¶WLW"¶µ1Rit 
GRHVQ¶WZRUNOLNHWKDWDWDOO´ (Focus Group, Apr 2008) 
Efficiency savings the 
real motive  
 
 
 
³6RZKHQ,ZDVSUHVHQWHGZLWKWKHSURMHFWWKHSURMHFWJX\VZHUHVD\LQJµ7KLVLVQRWDWD[VDYLQJSURMHFW¶$QGLI\RXWDONWRDQ\ERG\HOVHRXWVLGH
RIWKHSURMHFWWHDPWKH\DOOVD\µ:H¶UHRQO\GRLQJLWIRUWD[VDYLQJ¶,QWKHRU\LI\RX¶UHWU\LQJWRUHRUJDQL]H\RXUVHlf as a marketing 
RUJDQL]DWLRQDQG\RX¶YHPRYHGGHFLVLRQPDNHUVLQWRDWHDPRIfice in Eurocity, you do need to change workflows to make sure the decisions have 
EHHQDSSURSULDWHO\PDGH6RWKDW¶VWKHVRUWRIORJLFEHKLQGLW7KHUHDOLW\LV,WKLQNWKDWWKHUHDre huge savings to be had.´8.,QWHUYLHZ1RY
2007) 
 ³,¶OOEHUHDOO\EOXQWKHUH$OOZH¶UHWU\LQJWRGRKHUHLVPRYHRXUVKDUHSULFH´  (Focus Group, Apr 2008) 
Relational Legitimacy  
Poor outcomes for those 
who move 
³)URPZKDW,NQRZRIWKHEurocity RUJDQL]DWLRQLW¶VDYHU\ORQJKRXUVFXOWXUHIRUH[DPSOHLWVHHPVWREH,W¶VYHU\QXPEHUVGULYHQ,W¶VYHU\«
9HU\NLQGRIDELWUHDFWLYHVKRRWIURPWKHKLSUDWKHUWKDQEHLQJUHDOO\VRUWRIYLVLRQDU\DQGVWUDWHJLF´8.,QWHUYLHZ1RY 2007) 
³$QGZH¶YHQHYHUGUDZQXSWKHKHUH¶VWKHJDLQLQWD[+HUH¶VWKHORVVLQKXPDQFDSLWDO,VWKDWVWLOOWKHULJKWEDODQFH":H¶YHQHYHUKDGWKDWKRQHVW
RSHQGLVFXVVLRQ´8.,QWHUYLHZ)HE 
Cynicism  
Black Humor & 
Mockery 
³<RXFRXOGGULYHDFDUWDEXVDQGKRUVHVWKURXJKWKDWVWUDWHJ\WKDWVD\V³:HOO\RX¶UHVD\LQJEHFORVHto consumers and the people making all the 
VWUDWHJLFGHFLVLRQVDERXWWKHFRQVXPHUVDUHQRW%ULWLVKDUHQRWVLWWLQJLQWKHPDUNHWDUHQ¶WEHLQJH[SRVHGWRWKHPDUNHWRU the people or the culture 
VR\RXNQRZZHGRQ¶WKDYHLQWHUQDWLRQDOEUDQGVRIWKDWVFDOH:HKDYHDEXQFKRIUHJLRQDOEUDQGV´8.,QWHUYLHZ$SU 
³,QP\PDUNHWLQJJURXS LW¶VQRWD\HDURISXWWLQJFRQVXPHUVDQGFXVWRPHUVILUVWLW¶VFRVWLQFUHDVHVDQGZHLJKWUHGXFWLRQSURJUDPPHVUHDOO\
7KDW¶VILQHWKHUH¶VQRWKLQJZURQJZLWKWKDWLW¶VWKHULJKWWKLQJWRGRIRURXUEXVLQHVV,¶PVXUH,PSURYLQJRXUSURILWV«%XWGRQ¶WNLG\RXUVHOI
\RX¶UHWU\LQJWRGRVRPHWKLQJGLIIHUHQW´)RFXV*URXS$SU 
Accepting Inevitability  
It is going to happen ³6o therefore Brand Co have chosen, because of the cost saving benefits, to make the decision. So with that goes an organizational issue and you 
DFFHSWWKDW\RXNQRZ´8.,QWHUYLHZ1RY 
³&ertainly as we move to Project Europe and a European base «thHQ\HDK\RXFDQ¶WOHDYHWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQDVLWLVLW¶VMXVWRQHRIWKRVHWKLQJV´
(UK Interview, Aug 2008).   
³*RWQRFKRLFHKDYHZHUHDOO\"´)RFXVJURXS$XJ 
We have become part of ³$QGLQWKHUHVRPHZKHUHWKHUHZDVWKLVVHQVHRI\RXNQRZWKHZRUOGLVFKDQJLQJDURXQGXV««RXUFRPIRUWDEOHOLWWOHKRPHLVEeing broken up.  
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Europe 
 
:H¶UHDOOORRNLQJLQ«ZRUNLQJIRUGLIIHUHQWJURXSVDQGZHGRQ¶WPHHWDWWKHWRSDWWKH8.93OLNHZHXVHGWR$FNQRZOHGJHWKDWWKDW¶VFKDQJLQJ
DQGZH¶UHQRZSDUWRIWKH«ZHFDQ¶WMXVWFHOHEUDWHVXFFHVVDVD8.EXVLQHVVZHKDYHWRFHOHEUDWHVXFFHVVDVSDUWRIDQ(8EXVLQHVV´8.
Interview, Feb 2008) 
³,WKLQNRQHRIWKHWKLQJVWKDWWKHVDOHVSUREDEO\LGHQWLILHGZKLFKLVPRUHGHFLVLRQVPDGHE\(XURFLW\REYLRXVO\WKDW¶VDYHU\FRQVFLRXVHIIRUWRQ
EHKDOIRIRXUDQGFHUWDLQO\P\WHDP¶VSDUWEXWRXURXUSDUWE\SXVKLQJGHFLVLRQVWKHLUZD\µFDXVHWKDW¶VKRZZHKDYHWRRSerate in a compliant 
HQYLURQPHQW´)RFXV*URXS$XJ 2008) 
 
 
